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Chapter 1
Introduction
Behavioral Economics incorporates psychological insights into economics. For
more than half a century, it has identified a series of systematic violations of the neo-
classical economic theories. Inspired by these anomalies in the neoclassical contexts,
behavioral economists construct alternative theories with more realistic psychological
foundations. These theories have been shown to generate useful theoretical insights,
make better predictions of field phenomena, and suggest better policies (Loewenstein
et al., 2004).
One of the first challenges to the neoclassical economic theories focused on the
expected utility theory, in the context of decision making under risk. Expected utility
makes testable implications based on precise assumptions, and is therefore suitable
for behavioural economics to build upon. Studies followed the seminal papers by
Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961) have documented when and how decisions deviate
from expected utility. In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky proposed prospect theory as
an alternative descriptive model to the expected utility theory. More than 35 years
have passed and prospect theory has proved its value in a rich body of literature as
the best descriptive model in decision making under risk and uncertainty.
Most of the behavioral insights in decision making under risk and uncertainty
come from studies focusing on individual decisions in isolated contexts. This thesis
expands the current knowledge base by examining these insights in interpersonal
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contexts. It discusses in what interpersonal contexts and how people attenuate,
amplify, or replicate the biases they exhibit when making decisions separately.
Chapter 2 investigates the rationality of group decisions versus individual deci-
sions under risk. I use an experiment to study two group decision rules, majority
and unanimity, in stochastic dominance and Allais paradox tasks. I distinguish com-
munication effects (the effects of group discussion and interaction) from aggregation
effects (the impact of pure voting), which makes it possible to better understand the
complex dynamics of group decision making. I find both effects occur, but these
effects were stronger and occur more often under the unanimity rule. Communica-
tion effects always lead to more rational choices; aggregation effects do so sometimes,
but not always. Groups violate stochastic dominance less often than individuals do,
which is due to both aggregation and communication effects. In the Allais para-
dox tasks, there are almost no communication effects, and aggregation effects make
groups deviate more from expected utility than individuals.
Communication has an impact on not only collective decisions but also individual
ones. Interpersonal communication is an important means of collecting information.
Chapter 3 is concerned with the role of communication in individual judgment revi-
sion tasks. Except for an exchange of estimates, my design also allows the exchange
of supportive evidence underlying the estimates in a controlled manner. Compared
with control, the exchange of estimates and supportive evidence together improves
judgment quality at both the individual level and the crowd level. On the other
hand, the exchange of estimates or supportive evidence separately has either no or
even a negative impact.
Chapter 4 is a theoretical paper focusing on interpersonal comparison of risk
attitudes. Yaari (1969) defined person A as being more risk averse than person B
under uncertainty as A rejecting all bets that B rejects, and showed that, under
expected utility, this definition implies that A has more concave utility, and that A
and B share the same beliefs. Extended from Yaari’s results, my project proposes
weaker definitions of comparative risk aversion that are applicable for people who
hold different beliefs. Under subjective expected utility (SEU), these definitions by
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themselves no longer imply any constraint on beliefs. They are all necessary for A
to have more concave utility than B, and they are sufficient under additional belief
assumptions. The most general definitions require so weak belief assumptions that
they can also be used to compare risk aversion (possibly of a single person) towards
different sources of uncertainty.
In Chapter 5, I investigate the effects of cash on people’s risk attitudes. I ask I
ask subjects of two treatments to value the same set of lotteries in the experiment.
There is no communication between the subjects. All settings in the two treatments
are identical except for one: in the cash treatment, all possible outcomes of the lot-
teries are presented with real cash notes, whereas in the control treatment, outcomes
are denoted by written numbers. This chapter tests the effects of cash, the crucial
payment instrument in trading, on individual valuations.
The results suggest that presenting the lotteries with real cash lowers partici-
pants’ valuations, but does not affect their utility function. What drives the decrease
of valuation is likelihood insensitivity in probability weighting. Towards the same
lottery, subjects who value the one presented with cash exhibit less sensitivity to-
wards changes in likelihood than participants in the control treatment do. The mere
presentation with monetary currency could, without any real transaction, make a
psychological impact on people’ s risk attitudes.
3
4
Chapter 2
Group decision rules and group
rationality under risk
2.1 Introduction
Many economic decisions - e.g. family financial planning, corporate strategies,
national laws - are made by groups. The literature comparing individual and group
decision making is rich (Kugler et al., 2012). Groups have been found to attenuate,
amplify, or replicate the biases found for individual decisions (Kerr et al., 1996),
and these diverse findings highlight the closing remark of a recent review paper:
“Ultimately, the goal of comparing individual and group decision making is to identify
the contexts and types of decisions where each is likely to work best” (Charness and
Sutter, 2012, p. 174).
This chapter compares group and individual decision making for three tasks, a
test of non-transparent stochastic dominance, Allais’ common consequence paradox,
and Allais’ common ratio paradox. Stochastic dominance is an objective, generally
This chapter is based on the the homonymous paper, co-authored with Aurélien Baillon, Han
Bleichrodt, and Peter P. Wakker.
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accepted criterion of rationality but recognizing it may require intellectual effort. We
will therefore refer to this type of task as intellective. Previous research has shown
that groups violate stochastic dominance less frequently than individuals (Charness
et al., 2007), suggesting that group decisions improve rationality. Expected utility
(EU) violations are to a larger extent due to motivational or subjective aspects of
human behavior, for example the nonlinear weighting of probabilities. We will, there-
fore, call the Allais tasks judgmental. In this, we follow the psychological literature on
groups (e.g. Laughlin and Ellis 1986; Kerr and Tindale 2011), where problems with
a demonstrably correct answer are called intellective and tasks in which one cannot
objectively defend one’s preferred alternative as correct (e.g. aesthetic judgments
or matters of personal taste) are called judgmental. In Allais’ common consequence
and common ratio paradoxes (Allais, 1953), previous research has found that groups
violate EU as often as individuals do (Rockenbach et al. 2007; Bone et al. 1999;
Bateman and Munro 2005).
We distinguish two components in group decision making: aggregation and com-
munication. Aggregation refers to the direct effect of the procedure on the group
decision, without involving any change of an individual or any communication. In
single choice tasks, aggregation effects tend to amplify the patterns exhibited by the
majority, as we will show; these effects are merely procedural and statistical. For
tasks involving two choices (as in the Allais paradoxes), however, aggregation effects
can reverse the majority pattern. It then is, for example, possible that, while a ma-
jority of the group members behave according to EU, the group decision violates EU.
Aggregation effects are fleeting and do not affect individual attitudes or subsequent
individual decisions.
Communication effects do affect individuals. Communication effects are lasting
and capture the effects of group decision making beyond pure aggregation. These
effects include the impact of learning what others prefer and why they prefer it. For
instance, group decision making can foster discussion and this may change members’
preferences. Communication effects will persist after the group process has ended
(Maciejovsky et al., 2013).
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In our experiment, we measured the strength of aggregation and communication
effects for majority and unanimity group decisions. We elicited individual prefer-
ences before and after the group decision stage. Changes in individual preferences
were interpreted as communication effects. We also used a second approach to mea-
sure communication effects. To control for the effect of aggregation, we aggregated
the individual decisions before the group decision stage into simulated group deci-
sions. Differences between these simulated decisions and the actual group decisions
constitute communication effects. For instance, in the actual group decisions a mi-
nority sometimes convinced a majority to change their preferences, which was clearly
a communication effect.
The effects of decision rules are central in political economics (Feddersen and
Pesendorfer 1998; Messner and Polborn 2004), and have also been studied in psy-
chology (Kerr and Tindale, 2004). However, they have rarely been considered for
decisions under risk. An exception is Brunette et al. (2014), who implemented ma-
jority and unanimity voting rules, but did not permit verbal communication between
group members. Most existing studies considered groups of two individuals, for which
majority and unanimity rules make the same predictions and, therefore, cannot be
distinguished. We used groups of three individuals, for which these rules can be
distinguished. In intellective tasks, the results indicate that both rules led to ag-
gregation and communication effects, which improved both group rationality and
individual rationality. In the judgmental tasks there were mainly aggregation effects,
which led to more deviations from expected utility for groups than for individuals in
one of the tasks (the common ratio task).
2.2 Literature
According to social-decision scheme theory (Davis, 1973), group decisions are de-
termined by the majority view unless the minority view is demonstrably correct,
which is the case where “truth wins” (Laughlin and Ellis 1986; Davis 1992; Kerr and
Tindale 2011). This suggests that communication effects will be stronger when the
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reasons for choosing one option are easy to defend. Because answers in intellective
tasks are easier to defend than answers in judgmental tasks, we expect that commu-
nication effects will be stronger in the non-transparent stochastic dominance (NTSD)
tasks than in the Allais tasks.
The literature on group decision processes shows that the unanimity rule typically
leads to more communication than the majority rule. Moreover, group members
identify themselves more with unanimous decisions than with majority decisions
(Kameda, 1991). The deliberations of unanimity groups show more conflict and more
changes of opinion (Nemeth, 1977). Accordingly, we hypothesize that the unanimity
rule leads to more discussion than the majority rule and, consequently, to stronger
communication effects.
Several studies have investigated the effect of different aggregation rules on the
outcome of the decision process, both theoretically and experimentally. Dasgupta
and Maskin (2008) showed theoretically that the majority rule satisfies five appeal-
ing conditions (Pareto optimality, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant
alternatives, and decisiveness) over a larger class of preferences than any other voting
rule does and, in this sense, is the most robust rule.
For jury decision making, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) showed theoretically
that the unanimity rule is more likely to convict the innocent and to acquit the guilty
if jury members vote strategically. However, Goeree and Yariv (2011) found in an
experiment that such differences in jury decisions vanish when deliberation before
voting is allowed. Miller (1985) and Ohtsubo et al. (2004) showed experimentally
that majority group decisions tend to ignore the minority’s preferences whereas the
unanimity decisions incorporate the minority’s preferences when information about
each group member’s preference is available. Finally, Stasson et al. (1991) showed
that subjects from majority groups performed marginally better than subjects from
unanimity groups in mathematical tasks. However, groups consisting only of mem-
bers who had answered incorrectly in the individual tasks were more likely to find
the correct solution under the unanimity rule.
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2.3 Examples of aggregation effects
To clarify the role of aggregation and to show how it can distort group decisions,
we will give two simple examples, one involving a single choice (as in the NTSD task)
and one involving two choices (as in the Allais paradoxes).
Example 1: Aggregation effects in a single choice
Consider a choice between two lotteries where one lottery stochastically dominates
the other. Assume that a minority of the population violates stochastic dominance.
If people in this population form groups and the group choice is made by the majority
rule then sufficiently large groups will almost always satisfy stochastic dominance.
Aggregation effects amplify the majority choice, and provided the majority is rational,
will amplify rationality. This results purely from the aggregation procedure, without
involving any change of any person or any communication.
Example 2: Aggregation effects in a pair of choices
Aggregation effects are more complex when two choices have to be made as in
the Allais paradoxes. Consider two choices, each between a risky lottery R and a
safe lottery S. Then there are four possible choice patterns: SS, RR, SR, and RS.
The SS and RR patterns are consistent with EU (EU-consistent), and the SR and
RS patterns are EU-inconsistent. Suppose that 30% of the sample chooses SS, 30%
chooses RR, and 40% chooses SR. Then the majority of the population (60%) is EU-
consistent. If we randomly draw groups of three persons from this population and
let the group choice be determined by majority then SR will be chosen in 56.8% of
the cases and the majority, thus, exhibits an EU-inconsistent pattern. The opposite
case (a majority of EU-inconsistent people leading to a majority of EU-consistent
groups) can also occur1. Again, this results purely from the aggregation procedure.
1If the individuals exhibit patterns SS, RR, SR, and RS with probability 40%, 0%, 30%, 30%
respectively, then the groups will exhibit the same patterns with probability 56.8%, 0%, 21.6%, and
21.6%.
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2.4 Method
2.4.1 Experimental Design
156 students of Erasmus University Rotterdam participated in the experiment
(63% males). We organized 52 sessions of three subjects each.
Table 2.1: Structure of the experiment
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Control Individual Individual Individual
M-treatment Individual Majority Rule Individual
U-treatment Individual Unanimity Rule Individual
The experiment consisted of three stages (within-subjects) and three treatments
(between-subjects; see Table 2.1). A stage consisted of a set of instructions and
decision tasks, which subjects received on paper (called answer sheets hereafter). All
decision tasks were choices between two lotteries. The subjects in a session had their
own colored pen (blue, red, or black) to mark their preferred lottery on the answer
sheet so that we could identify individual choices.
In the first and third stages of the experiment, subjects made individual choices
and were not allowed to talk with each other. Only the second stage of the experi-
ment differed between treatments. In the control treatment, subjects made individual
decisions (without communication), as in the other two stages. This permitted us
to check for any learning effect. In the M-treatment, the three subjects in a session
made group decisions using the majority rule and they could communicate face-
to-face in English. All subjects, after (possible) discussion, marked their preferred
lotteries. The option with at least two ticks was taken as the group choice, but mi-
nority subjects could still express disagreement. In the U-treatment subjects had to
reach unanimity. All three subjects of a session had to tick the same lottery, oth-
erwise the choice was invalid and would not be paid (see the section on incentives
below). The groups of the U-treatment always reached unanimity. Subjects could
freely and directly communicate during the group decisions (Stage 2 of M- and U-
treatment). In the control treatment, answering all questions took 21 minutes on
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average. In the other two treatments, subjects needed about 7 minutes more due to
group deliberations.
Stage 1 gave us information on subjects’ behavior before any treatment manipu-
lation. We used these choices to simulate the group decisions they would have made
based on the majority rule and, thereby, we inferred the effect of pure aggregation
without any communication. We could then compare the actual group decisions in
stage 2 with these simulated decisions to measure the effects beyond pure aggrega-
tion. Finally, stage 3 gave information about whether any changes in preferences
that we observed in stage 2 were temporary (and thus probably due to aggregation
effects) or lasting (which is likely for communication effects).
Each session of three subjects was randomly assigned to one treatment. We ran
13 sessions for the control treatment, 21 sessions for the M-treatment, and 18 sessions
for the U-treatment. There were fewer sessions of the control treatments to have more
observations in M- and U-treatments, which concerned the main research questions.
2.4.2 Stimuli
Subjects faced three types of decision tasks in each stage of the experiment:
NTSD tasks, CR tasks, and CC tasks. We present these tasks below. The order of
the choices was randomized within each of the three stages (it was therefore possible
that two questions for the same CR task were far apart in the experiment), but the
order was the same for all subjects. Huber et al. (2008) showed that choices are
affected by the first and the last choice made. No distortions result when there are
no more than three choices, as in our experiment.
Subjects had to choose between two lotteries, A and B. Table 2 gives an example
of the way choices were displayed. Uncertainty was resolved using the roll of a twenty-
sided die. The first row of Table 2.1 shows the outcomes of the roll of the die. Rows
2 and 3 show the payoffs of the two lotteries under each roll of the die. Subjects
indicated their choice by ticking the cell of the last column of their preferred lottery.
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NTSD tasks
Charness et al. (2007) found that groups are more likely to satisfy stochastic
dominance than individuals, but did not specify the aggregation rule that groups
should follow and did not check whether the group effects persisted in later individual
choices. Maciejovsky et al. (2013) found that group effects persisted in intellective
tasks other than NTSD, but they did not distinguish between the majority rule and
the unanimity rule as their group size was two, for which the two rules lead to the
same results. We adapted the NTSD tasks first used by Tversky and Kahneman
(1986).
Table 2.2: An NTSD task
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Lottery
A e0 e35 e30 e5
Lottery
B e5 e10 e35 e0
Table 2.2 is an example of a NTSD task faced by the subjects. Lottery B results
from lottery A by improving e30 into e35 and by improving two outcomes e5 into
e10. Consequently, lottery B stochastically dominates lottery A. However, this dom-
inance is not immediately obvious and a subject who neglects probability differences
and only compares the outcomes of the lotteries may have the false impression that
A is better than B because it yields money amounts e5, e30, and e35, whereas Lot-
tery B yields money amounts e5, e10, and e35. Because the violation of stochastic
dominance in Table 2 is non-transparent, we refer to these tasks as NTSD. Some
theories allow for such violations of stochastic dominance (Kahneman and Tversky
1979; Viscusi 1989). Table 2.3 summarizes the tests of non-transparent stochastic
dominance that we carried out. Note that the tests are comparable in structure but
differ across the three stages.
CC tasks
The CC tasks were close to those of Huck and Müller (2012) with a small adjust-
ment to fit into our 20-sided die format.
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Table 2.3: NTSD questions
Dominated Lottery Dominant Lottery
20% 5% 15% 60% 25% 10% 5% 60%
35 30 5 0 5 10 35 0
40 30 8 0 8 12 40 0
Stage 1 40 35 5 0 5 10 40 0
45 40 10 0 10 15 45 0
35 28 5 0 5 10 35 0
35 32 8 0 8 12 35 0
35 30 8 0 8 12 35 0
Stage 2 45 35 5 0 5 10 45 0
40 35 10 0 10 15 40 0
45 28 8 0 8 12 35 0
40 28 5 0 5 12 40 0
45 30 8 0 8 15 45 0
Stage 3 45 25 10 0 10 15 45 0
40 25 5 0 5 10 40 0
35 30 8 0 8 12 35 0
The second row indicates the probabilities of the outcomes; the
numbers below the probabilities indicate payoffs in e
Table 2.4: A CC task
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Lottery
S es
Lottery
R e0 es er
a) First Choice
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Lottery
S es e0
Lottery
R e0 er
b) Second Choice
Notes: Actual payoffs s and rare in Table 2.5. In the experiment, lotteries were presented as Lottery A and Lottery
B.
Table 2.4 shows the structure of the CC tasks. Table 2.5 presents the different
values of s, r, and q that we used in the experiment 2. Each CC task involved two
choices between Lottery S and Lottery R with the second choice similar to the first
except that the (common) q chance (60% in the above example) of es was changed
2Stage 1 had four CC tasks and Stages 2 and 3 had three CC tasks.
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into a q chance of nothing.
According to the sure-thing principle (Savage, 1954) of EU, replacing a common
payoff by another common payoff does not affect preference. Hence EU predicts
the same preference in both choices, either SS or RR. However, empirically, many
subjects violate EU and display the pattern SR, which can be due to the certainty
effect(see Starmer 2000, for a survey). The opposite pattern, RS, has also been
observed (Starmer 1992; Wu et al. 2005; Blavatskyy 2013) although less often.
Table 2.5: Payoffs and common probability of the CC tasks
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
s 8 8 9 8 10 9 10 10 8 10
r 25 25 30 20 45 30 45 40 20 40
q 0.60 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.55
Notes: The first column means that in Table 2.4, we used s=e8, r=e25, and q=60%.The
first choice was therefore between a Lottery S yielding e8 for sure and a Lottery R yielding
e25 with probability 20%, e8 with probability 60% and e0 otherwise. The second choice
involved Lottery S, yielding e8 with probability 40% (=100%-q) and nothing otherwise, and
Lottery R yielding e25 with probability 20% and nothing otherwise.
CR tasks
The CR questions were adapted from Loomes (1988), using the design of Van de
Kuilen and Wakker (2006). Table 2.6 shows the way the CR choices were presented
Table 2.6: A CR task
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Lottery
S es
Lottery
R er e0
a) First Choice
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Lottery
S es e0
Lottery
R e0 er
b) Second Choice
Notes: Actual payoffs s and r can be found in Table 2.7. In the experiment, lotteries were presented as Lottery A
and Lottery B.
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to the subjects. The second choice follows from the first by dividing all probabilities
at nonzero outcomes by 4. According to the independence condition of EU (Fishburn
and Wakker, 1995),this should not affect preferences. Hence EU predicts the same
choice in both situations, either SS or RR. However, empirically, the prevailing pat-
tern is SR, which violates EU.The opposite violation RS, has rarely been observed.
Table 2.7: Payoffs of the CR tasks
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
s 18 9 14 10.5 20 16.5 15 9.5 11.5 12.5 13 10 15.5 17.5 19
r 24.5 12 18 14.5 25.5 22.5 20.5 13 15 17.5 18 14 21.5 24 25
Incentives
Upon completion of the experiment, subjects received a e5 participation fee. In
addition, they played out one of their choices for real. First, one of the 3 stages was
randomly selected. All subjects in a session played out a choice that was made in
this stage. If the selected stage was an individual stage (Stages 1 and 3 for the M-
and U-treatments, and all stages for the control treatment), each subject randomly
drew one choice and played out the lottery they preferred in that choice.
If the second stage was selected in the M- and U-treatments, the lottery the group
had chosen was played out and the three subjects received the same payoff. In the
group decision making stage, subjects shared the consequences of their choice. We
explained this group incentive procedure in the M- and U-treatments at the beginning
of Stage 2. The instructions were the same across treatments, except for Stage 2.
2.4.3 Analysis
In the individual decisions (all three stages of the control and stage 1 and 3 of the
M- and U-treatments), we used subjects’ reported choices as input in the analysis.
In the group decisions (stage 2 for the M- and U-treatments), we assigned the choices
of his group to each subject. For the M-treatment in stage 2, we could also use the
choices reported by each subject, since they were allowed to express disagreement
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with the group choice. Thirty-one percent of the majority group decisions revealed
disagreement. Our conclusions did not depend on whether we analyzed the group
choices or the reported choices in the second stage of the M-treatment (Alternative
results are available upon request).
We used probit3 models to study the likelihood of violations of stochastic domi-
nance and multinomial probit models to study the likelihood of the four CC and CR
patterns. We used clustered standard errors in the probit regressions.For the NTSD
tasks, the dependent (binary) variable indicated whether or not the choice satisfied
stochastic dominance. For the CC and the CR tasks, the dependent (categorical)
variable described the choice pattern(SS, SR, RS, or RR).
We used the dummy variables majority, unanimity, stage2, and stage3 to code
stages and treatments. The main effects stage2 and stage3 captured the effect of
learning. Our main independent variables represented the interaction terms of the
treatments with the stages. The terms majority*stage2 and unanimity*stage2 iden-
tified the full effect of group decision making (both aggregation and communication
effects). The terms majority*stage3 and unanimity*stage3 captured the changes in
preferences after the group stage and provided a first method to estimate communi-
cation effects.
As explained before, the second method to disentangle aggregation and commu-
nication effects used the individual choices (of stage 1 for the M- and U-treatments
and stages 1 and 2 for the control treatment) to simulate aggregate choices. For
the majority rule,as each session consisted of three subjects, we could in each case
simulate the majority group choice. These simulated group choices captured the
pure aggregation effects. The difference between the simulated and the actual group
choices provided an estimate of communication effects.The majority preference is also
the most plausible benchmark for the U-treatment. A deviation from the majority
choice then can only occur if some group members were willing to change their mind,
and there must then have been communication effects. The analysis of the simulated
and the group choices was the same as the analysis of the individual and the group
3Results from alternative logit models are available upon request.
16
choices, which was described above, except that we excluded stage 3 and, thus, used
fewer data points. The interpretation of the results of the third stage is unclear for
the simulated data. Finally, we also recorded and studied the group discussions. In
nearly 40% of the groups, arguments based on stochastic dominance were used (with-
out using this term though). The dummy variable dominance_discussion identified
the members of such groups.
2.5 Result
2.5.1 NTSD tasks
Figure 2.1 displays the proportion of choices satisfying stochastic dominance,
for the actual choices(panel A) and when individual choices are replaced by the
simulated choices (panel B). Panel A shows that only a minority of subjects chose
the dominant lottery in the first stage. In the control treatment, the proportion
of choices satisfying stochastic dominance increased from around 40% in stage 1 to
around 50% in stage 2 to slightly below 60% in stage 3, suggesting modest learning.
In the M- and U-treatments, we see a faster increase in the second stage, due to
aggregation and communication effects. The comparison of the group choices with
the simulated choices (panel B) confirms that even though subjects of all treatments
better identify dominant lotteries as the experiment progresses, this improvement is
faster in the M- and U-treatments than in the control treatment.
Table 2.8 reports the results of the probit regressions. The first column, which
reports the results for the actual choices, shows that the use of stochastic dominance
arguments in the group discussion was crucial. Groups in which no stochastic domi-
nance arguments were used did not differ from the control treatment. However, there
were strong group effects in stages 2 and 3 for groups that did talk about stochastic
dominance(captured by the three-way interaction terms between stages, treatments
and dominance_discussion). Hence, a subject who used stochastic dominance argu-
ments strongly affected not only his group’s choices in stage 2 but also the individual
choices of his fellow group members in stage 3, indicating communication effects.
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Table 2.8: Probit regressions for the NTSD tasks
Group vs. individual choices Group vs. simulated choices
stage2 0.06 (0.04) 0.14** (0.07)
stage3 0.13** (0.06)
majority -0.09 (0.09) -0.05 (0.17)
unanimity -0.17* (0.10) -0.17 (0.17)
stage2*majority 0.02 (0.07) 0.01 (0.12)
stage2*unanimity -0.16 (0.10) -0.14 (0.14)
stage3*majority -0.02 (0.08)
stage3*unanimity -0.11 (0.09)
majority*dominance_discussion 0.24** (0.11) 0.34* (0.18)
unanimity*dominance_discussion 0.12 (0.12) 0.08 (0.17)
stage2*majority*
dominance_discussion 0.44*** (0.14) 0.50** (0.24)
stage2*unanimity*
dominance_discussion 0.84*** (0.15) 0.89*** (0.21)
stage3*majority*
dominance_discussion 0.34*** (0.13)
stage3*unanimity*
dominance_discussion 0.47*** (0.14)
No. of observations 2340 520
Wald chi2 149.69 74.69
p-value 0.00 0.00
Notes: Reported numbers are the marginal effects at the means of covariates, followed by significance and
clustered standard errors between brackets. The standard errors in the left column are clustered at the individual
level4, and those in the right column are clustered at the group level.
* indicates significant at 10% (two-sided test)
** indicates significant at 5% (two-sided test)
*** indicates significant at 1% (two-sided test)
In the M-treatment, the significant interaction term dominance_discussion*majority
captures the difference in the proportions who satisfied stochastic dominance in stage
1 between subjects who talked about stochastic dominance in stage 2 and those who
did not.
The comparison of group choices with simulated choices confirmed that commu-
nication effects played a role in both the M-treatment and the U-treatment.Once
aggregation effects were ruled out, groups that talked about stochastic dominance
were still more likely to choose the dominant lotteries in all stages than those that did
not talk about stochastic dominance. The three-way interactions between majority,
dominance_discussion, and stage2 and between unanimity, dominance_discussion,
and stage2 were significant, showing that the choices of groups that talked about
stochastic dominance were affected by communication effects beyond pure aggrega-
tion effects. Majority and unanimity seemed to have fostered discussions, which
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increased subjects’ rationality. The importance of avoiding biases and increasing ra-
tionality has often been emphasized (Viscusi, 1995, p. 108) and our analysis shows
that group decision making may contribute to such increasing rationality.
2.5.2 CC tasks
Neither the majority nor the unanimity group rule led to more EU-consistent
choices in the common consequence Allais paradoxes. In the first stage, half of our
subjects’ choices were consistent with EU (32% of the choice patterns were RR and
18% were SS). Surprisingly, the violations of EU were mainly of the RS type: 45%
of the patterns were RS and only 5% of the empirically common SR. This finding
does not confirm the certainty effect. The low occurrence of the SR pattern led to
estimation problems and we excluded it from the analysis reported below. Keeping
the SR pattern whenever possible gave similar results as those reported next (these
results available upon request).
The proportion of EU violations slightly dropped in the second stage, but this
held for all treatments and it disappeared in the third stage. The control and the
M-treatment look very similar. In the U-treatment, there was a more pronounced
increase in the proportion of RR choices, but, again, the effect did not last. Several
studies have found that risk aversion is negatively related to cognitive ability (Fred-
erick 2005; Dohmen et al. 2010; Dohmen et al. 2011). This finding could suggest that
the unanimity rule also led to more rationality in the CC task. It is consistent with
Keck et al. (2014) finding that groups are closer to EU (ambiguity neutrality) than
individuals. However, the effect did not last5.
Table 2.9 shows the results of the multinomial probit regressions. Subjects became
more risk averse during the experiment as indicated by the positive coefficient of
stage 3 in the SS choices. Groups were more risk seeking than individuals: in stage
2, the prevalence of the SS pattern was less in the M- and U-treatments than in
5The literature that compares risk attitudes between groups and individuals gives mixed results.
Rockenbach et al. (2007) and Viscusi et al. (2011) found that groups were more risk seeking than
individuals. On the other hand, Masclet et al. (2009) found that groups were more risk averse than
individuals. Adams and Ferreira (2010) found that groups made decisions closer to risk neutrality
than individuals do.
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Table 2.9: Probit regressions for the CC tasks
Group vs. individual choices Group vs. simulated choices
Choice pattern SS RR RS SS RR RS
stage2 0.02 0.08 -0.10* 0.02 0.12 -0.13
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.11)
stage3 0.06** -0.01 -0.06
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
majority -0.02 -0.04 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.04
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12)
unanimity -0.04* -0.02 0.07 -0.15 0.03 0.12
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12)
stage2*majority -0.10** 0.03 0.07 -0.06 0.02 0.04
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.13) (0.14)
stage2*unanimity -0.29*** 0.25*** 0.04 -0.08 0.18 -0.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.12) (0.13)
stage3*majority -0.05 0.00 0.05
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
stage3*unanimity -0.05 -0.00 0.05
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
No. of observations 1481 350
Wald chi2 86.83 32.94
p-value 0.00 0.00
Notes: Reported numbers are the marginal effects at the means of covariates, followed by
significance and clustered standard errors between brackets. The standard errors in the left
three columns are clustered at the individual level, and those in the right three columns are
clustered at the group level. Missing choices and SR patterns are excluded.
* indicates significant at 10% (two-sided test)
** indicates significant at 5% (two-sided test)
*** indicates significant at 1% (two-sided test)
the control treatment (see model 1). The RR pattern was also more common in the
U-treatment than in the control group in Stage 2 (model 3). However, the two-way
interactions in stage 3 (stage3*majority and stage3*unanimity) were not significant
and there was no evidence of communication effects. When comparing group choices
with simulated choices, the treatment effects on the SS and RR patterns at stage
2 disappeared, confirming the absence of communication effects. The tendency to
make riskier group decisions was thus mainly due to aggregation effects.
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2.5.3 CR tasks
In the CR tasks, we again found that about half of the subjects satisfied EU in
the first stage (29% SS pattern, 22% RR pattern). This time we found the usual
SR violation of EU (41%). We do not report the results about the infrequent RS
pattern, because it led to estimation problems in one of the regressions. As in the CC
tasks, group choices tended to be more risk seeking than individual choices. However,
this time the shift was from SS to the EU-inconsistent SR pattern and less to the
EU-consistent RR pattern.
Table 2.10: Probit regressions for the CR tasks
Group vs. individual choices Group vs. simulated choices
Choice pattern SS RR RS SS RR RS
stage2 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09)
stage3 -0.00 0.05 -0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
majority -0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.04
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13)
unanimity -0.10* 0.03 0.07 -0.09 -0.07 0.16
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13)
stage2*majority -0.19*** 0.03 0.16** -0.10 0.06 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
stage2*unanimity -0.19*** 0.04 0.14* -0.11 0.15* -0.04
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12)
stage3*majority -0.08 0.01 0.07
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
stage3*unanimity -0.05 -0.00 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
No. of observations 2202 505
Wald chi2 53.82 24.70
p-value 0.00 0.00
Notes: Reported numbers are the marginal effects at the means of covariates, followed by
significance and clustered standard errors between brackets. The standard errors in the left
three columns are clustered at the individual level, and those in the right three columns are
clustered at the group level. Missing choices and RS patterns are excluded.
* indicates significant at 10% (two-sided test)
** indicates significant at 5% (two-sided test)
*** indicates significant at 1% (two-sided test)
The multinomial probit regressions in Table 2.10 confirmed that the M- and U-
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treatments decreased the number of SS patterns and increased the number of SR
patterns. These effects did not last in stage 3, suggesting that they were aggregation
effects. This suggestion was confirmed by the comparison between the group choices
and the simulated choices, in which these effects disappeared: the prevalence of the
SS and SR patterns in the actual group choices (stage 2 of the M- and U-treatments)
did not differ from the prevalence of these patterns in the simulated choices.
In the regression comparing groups with simulated choices, there were marginally
more RR-choices in stage 2 than in stage 1 for treatment U, suggesting that commu-
nication increased risk seeking. This was not observed in the regression comparing
groups with individual choices. This result indicates that aggregation effects and
communication effects had opposite effects on the proportion of RR choices. Com-
munication effects led to an increase in RR choices, whereas aggregation effects re-
duced them. These effects could not be observed in the actual choices because the
aggregation effects and communication effects were close in magnitude and cancelled
out. It shows the added value of analyzing the simulated choices. That communica-
tion effects led to more risk seeking suggests that individual choices may be too risk
averse and (some) more risk seeking may be rational. On the other hand, the effect
was only modest and in contrast with the findings on NTSD, it did not persist in the
third stage.
2.5.4 Additional analysis
We recorded the decision time at each stage. Table 2.11 reports the results of
a linear regression of decision times on treatments and on stages. The M- and U-
treatments took more time than the control treatment in stage 2, but they did not
differ from each other (p=0.20). Response time decreased for the second and third
stages of the control treatment and we also observed that the response time was
less in the third stage than in the first stage in the majority and the unanimity
treatments.
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Table 2.11: Linear regression on decision time
stage2 -1.77* (0.96)
stage3 -2.73*** (0.96)
majority 0.05 (0.86)
unanimity 0.50 (0.89)
stage2*majority 3.72*** (1.22)
stage2*unanimity 5.16*** (1.26)
stage3*majority -0.27 (1.22)
stage3*unanimity -0.57 (1.26)
Notes: Reported numbers are regression coef-
ficients, followed by significance and standard
errors. The unit of the dependent variable is
minute.
* indicates significant at 10% (two-sided test)
** indicates significant at 5% (two-sided test)
*** indicates significant at 1% (two-sided test)
2.6 Conclusion
We disentangled communication effects and aggregation effects in group decisions.
This allowed us to analyze the effects of unanimity and majority rules on intellective
and judgmental tasks under risk. Our results show that:
a) Both aggregation effects and communication effects occurred but these effects
were stronger and occurred more often under the unanimity rule.
b) Aggregation effects were mixed and did not always lead to more rational
choices. Aggregation effects reduced violations of stochastic dominance, but they
also reduced EU-consistent patterns in Allais’ common ratio tasks, and they changed
the distribution of EU-consistent choice patterns in Allais’ common consequence task
without affecting the overall proportion of EU-consistent choice patterns.
c) Communication effects favored the justifiable (rational) choices and had more
impact in intellective tasks than in judgmental tasks. When there was a clear ar-
gument for a particular choice, such as in the nontransparent stochastic dominance
tasks, then communication effects could strongly increase the proportion of such
choices in the group decisions. Communication effects led to more risk seeking in the
common ratio tasks (with marginal significance), but not in the common consequence
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tasks. Communication effects increased rationality but they also increased decision
times.
The separation of communication and aggregation effects introduced in this chap-
ter sheds new light on the pros and cons of group decision rules and on their differences
with individual decisions. In particular, we can test whether these rules increase the
rationality of group decisions, and have a lasting impact on individual decisions af-
ter the group process is over. Our results show that communication effects play an
important role and deserve further study.
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Chapter 3
Individual decision making with
controlled communication
3.1 Introduction
Combining estimates from different people, even by simply taking the average,
can generate a surprisingly accurate aggregate estimate under certain circumstances.
This phenomenon was first observed more than one hundred years ago (Galton 1907),
and is often referred to as the wisdom of the crowd (WoC). WoC has been observed in
many scientific studies and general observations (Surowiecki 2005), and its application
has been studied in various tasks and environments (Laughlin et al. 2006; Chen 2007;
Pentland 2007; Nguyen 2008; Krause et al. 2010; Lee and Chang 2010; Lykourentzou
et al. 2010; Beer 2013). Although WoC is of a statistical nature (Stroop 1932), taking
full advantage of WoC requires behavioral insights to design proper processes where
WoC is likely to work best.
One of the claimed cornerstones of WoC is independence, which requires that indi-
This chapter is based on the homonymous paper, co-authored with Chen Li.
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viduals form and express their opinions independent of others’ influences (Surowiecki,
2005; Wagner and Vinaimont, 2010). In his best seller, Surowiecki (2005) documented
a series of collective failures showing the possible downside of communication.
In many real life situations, decisions are rarely made by one individual acting
alone. Blocking communication is unrealistic. Projects from “CorporationWikipedia”
(Lykourentzou et al., 2010) to the recent plan of “Listening government” in the UK
(Coleman and Blumler, 2011) highly depend on the internet to harness the WoC,
and communication is ubiquitous in such environments. Moreover, it is premature
to see communication as a problem. Two questions have to be answered first. How
important is independence for judgment aggregation and how does communication
affect independence?
When individual judgments are used as input of a combination process that takes
the average of individual judgments, independence is valuable as it cultivates di-
versity and makes the crowd more accurate. In this special case, the magnitude of
individual errors matters little as long as these errors cancel out. In many cases,
however, when other aggregation rules, such as approval voting, are used, individual
accuracy also matters. For instance, imagine that two committees, each with 21
experts, are forecasting the GDP growth next year. In committee A, the judgment
distribution is: 10 members predict 1.7%; 10 members predict 3%; and 1 member
predicts 2.3%. Whereas the judgment distribution in committee B is: 10 members
predict -5%; 10 members predict 9%; and 1 member predicts 2%. It turns out that
GDP grows 2%. The average predictions of both committees are equally accurate.
But if the committees take a poll to determine their final predictions, committee A is
more likely to reach a more accurate consensus than committee B is. Hence, a com-
prehensive evaluation of the communication effects requires measuring the quality of
both individual and aggregate judgments.
The prevailing finding on communication is that judgment communication im-
proves individual accuracy (Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000; Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006;
Mannes, 2009; Soll and Larrick, 2009; Soll and Mannes, 2011). The effects of com-
munication on crowd accuracy (we shall refer to the accuracy of the average as crowd
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accuracy), however, are less conclusive. Although closely related, only a few studies
on wisdom of the crowd jointly investigated the effect of social interaction on individ-
ual accuracy and crowd accuracy. In an experiment with face-to-face communication
(Jenness, 1932), individual accuracy was found to increase substantially after dis-
cussion, whereas crowd accuracy decreased undesirably. In a recent study (Lorenz
et al., 2011) with non-verbal communication, the authors found that communica-
tion decreased crowd diversity, and boosted individual confidence without improving
crowd accuracy. A re-analysis of the same data showed that individual accuracy
increased after communication, and challenged the results of Lorenz et al. (2011) on
the ground that the crowd diversity criteria they adopted favored excessive variance
(Farrell, 2011).
This paper investigates the impact of communication on quality of individual and
crowd judgments jointly. We introduce measures capturing different aspects of judg-
ment quality and related psychological traits at both the individual and the crowd
level, aiming to provide a more comprehensive picture of how communications of
different information contents influence a variety of important aspects of judgment
quality. We found that, when judgment was exchanged together with supporting
evidence, both individual and crowd accuracy improved, without harming the diver-
sity of opinion. However, when individual judgments or supportive evidence were
exchanged separately, there was no impact on judgment quality at both individual
and crowd levels.
Method: Experimental Design
Subjects
Subjects were 252 high school students from Donghu Middle School (101) and
Caidian No.2 Middle School (151) in Hubei province in China. They were from the
10th grade, with age ranging from 15 to 17.
Tasks
Following the literature (Galton, 1907; Lorenz et al., 2011), we use simple esti-
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mation tasks on general knowledge to study the communication effects. For every
subject in each treatment, three types of questions were asked. A full list of questions
are in Appendix A.
• Estimation questions (ESQ): 15 general knowledge questions about the total
number of elements in a specified set, such as “How many countries are there in
Asia?” and “How many fictional characters have appeared in the Harry Potter
series?”
• Confidence questions (CQ): 15 questions asking subjects to indicate their con-
fidence in their answer to each corresponding estimation question on a 7-point
scale.
• Evidence questions (EVQ): 15 questions asking subjects to provide supporting
evidence of their answers to each corresponding estimation question. A typical
evidence question asks the subjects to state 3 elements that they think others
are most likely not to be able to think of. One example of an evidence question
is: Please name 3 Asian countries that you think the others most likely will not
think of.
Treatments with communication of different information contents
We have three main between-subjects treatments where we vary the information
content during the communication, and a control treatment.
• Judgment Exchange (JE): estimation and confidence questions asked; estimates
exchanged.
• Evidence and Judgment Exchange (EJE): all three types of questions asked;
evidence and estimates exchanged.
• Evidence Exchange (EE): all three types of questions asked; evidence exchanged.
We have a control treatment to account for the learning effects of repeating the tasks.
• Control (CO): ESQ and CQ asked; no communication.
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In addition, we have another treatment (ECO) without communication, similar to
the control treatment, but we ask all three types of questions (ESQ, CQ and EVQ).
This treatment accounts for the possible effects of asking the EVQ questions.
The most commonly studied communication is the exchange of individual judg-
ment, for instance, individual estimates in estimation tasks (Larrick et al., 2011).
Although judgment exchange is the most straightforward way of communication,
in every day life people often add supporting arguments or evidence. In certain
cases, people only exchange evidence and/or reasoning without providing their def-
inite judgments. Communication does not always lead to convergence of opinions,
and in cases when the shared information is open to different interpretations, it can
even lead beliefs to diverge due to the confirmation bias (Loewenstein and Moore,
2004). Therefore, in this paper, we consider communications of different information
contents: exchanging estimates alone (JE), exchanging evidence alone (EE), and ex-
changing estimates with evidence (EJE). Apart from the three treatment groups,
we have two control treatments, where the first one is to account for the effects of
merely repeating the tasks (without communication) on individual and crowd judg-
ment quality, and the second control treatment is to account for the additional impact
of writing down evidence (without communication).
Procedure
The experiment was paper and pencil based, run in classrooms. All subjects were
randomly assigned subject ID’s which they used to identify themselves throughout
the experiment. The experimental instructions are in Appendix B.
The sessions of all treatment groups consist of two within-subject stages. In
the control treatment, questionnaires 1 consisting of 15 estimation questions and
the corresponding confidence questions were handed out and recollected after the
subjects finished answering all the questions in stage 1. In stage 2, questionnaires 2
with the identical questions were handed out and recollected.
In the other treatments, an answer sheet was handed out together with question-
naire 1. The content of the answer sheet differs across treatments. On the answer
sheet, subjects were asked to write down answers to estimation questions in the
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judgment exchange treatment, evidence questions in the evidence exchange treat-
ment, and answers to both estimation and evidence questions in the judgment and
evidence exchange.
At the end of stage 1, the experimenter collected questionnaires 1 and the separate
answer sheets. The answer sheets were randomly redistributed among the class and
it was ensured that one subject did not receive her own answer sheet. Stage 2 was the
same with that of the control treatment except that subjects answered the questions
again in presence of pieces of information from another subject. A summary of the
experimental design is presented in table 1.
The procedure of non-verbal information exchange paradigm that we adopted is
similar to that in Soll and Larrick (2009), where communication among subjects is
mediated by the experimenters. It ensures more control over the contents of commu-
nication, and is in line with the Delphi method, introduced to overcome the potential
drawbacks of face-to-face communication (Linstone and Turoff, 1975). One example
of such drawbacks is the “normative influence” (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955) of social
communication, which may have led to excessive conformity to others’ opinion out
of social concerns. Unlike the traditional Delphi method, where communication is
in free form, we gave specific instructions to the subjects so that they provide and
receive supporting evidence in one standard format.
Table 3.1: Summary of the experimental design
Treatment Questionnaire 1 Exchange Questionnaire 2
ESQ CQ EVQ ESQ EVQ ESQ CQ
EJE (n=49) X X X X X X X
EE (n=52) X X X x X X X
JE (n=51) X X x X x X X
CO (n=47) X X x x x X X
ECO (n=53) X X X x x X X
Incentives
Each subject received 10 yuan (about 1.5 USD at the time of the experiment)
as show-up fee. In each treatment, 8 subjects were randomly selected to be paid an
extra bonus depending on the accuracy of their estimates. For each selected subject,
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one number is randomly drawn. The number determines which question on which
questionnaire will be used for the subject’s bonus payment. Extra bonus was 100
yuan, 50 yuan or 20 yuan if the estimate differ from the true value by no more than
10%1, more than 10% but no more than 20% or more than 20% but no more than
40%, respectively; otherwise, they receive no extra bonus payment.
3.2 Theory and Measures
3.2.1 Individual-level measure
At the individual level, we are interested in the change in both individual accuracy
and confidence after communication of different information content.
Individual Accuracy
Let xsiq denote the estimate of individual i for estimation question q in stage s
(s = 1, 2). Let tq > 0 be the true answer to question q. Define (relative) individual
error as : esiq =
|xsiq−tq|
tq
, so that the errors are comparable across different questions.
Define individual accuracy as aiq = 1−esiq; and individual accuracy change as ∆aiq =
a2iq − a1iq. A positive change in accuracy (∆aiq > 0 ) corresponds to a decrease in
errors, and hence improvement in accuracy.
Individual Confidence
Let csiq denote the confidence level of individual i for estimation question q in stage
s (s = 1, 2). Similarly, we define individual confidence change as ∆ciq = c2iq − c1iq,
where a positive change in confidence corresponds to increase in confidence after
judgment revision.
3.2.2 Crowd-level measure
We refer to subjects in the same treatment as one crowd. At the crowd level, we
analyze the change of the crowd performance in three aspects.
Crowd Accuracy
1It is 10% of the true value.
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Crowd accuracy measures how accurate the crowd would be had it averaged
the estimates of its members. Simple average is one of the most popular opinion
aggregation rules, and many studies have documented its superiority to individual
estimates in various tasks (e.g. Laughlin et al. 2006; Chen 2007; Pentland 2007;
Nguyen 2008; Krause et al. 2010; Lee and Chang 2010; Lykourentzou et al. 2010;
Beer 2013; Bolger and Rowe 2015).
For crowd c (with nc individuals) and estimation task q, we define crowd error
as the distance between the crowd average and the correct answer, adjusted by the
correct answer: cesq =
| 1nc
∑
i x
s
iq−tq|
tq
. Define crowd accuracy as caj = 1− ceq, and the
crowd accuracy change as ∆caq = ca2q − ca1q.
Elite Percentage
We define the Elite Percentage (ep) as the proportion of high accuracy individuals:
epsq =
∑nc
i=1 1(esiq<l)/nc, where 1(·) is an indicator function, which takes value 1 if the
individual error is smaller than a chosen threshold level l, and 0 otherwise. This
measure captures the proportion of individuals with highly accurate estimate in the
crowd. The elite percentage change is ∆epsq = ep2q − ep1q.
Crowd Diversity
We define the crowd diversity cdsq as the standard deviation of individual answers
adjusted by the true answer axsiq =
xsiq
tq
:
cdsq =
√
1
nc − 1
∑
i
(axsiq − axsq)2,
where axsq =
1
nc
∑nc
i=1 ax
s
iq. The greater the diversity measure is, the more diversified
the crowd’s judgments are. The crowd diversity change is ∆cdq = cd2q − cd1q.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Individual-level
Figure 3.1 shows the impact of different contents of communication on the change
of individual accuracy and confidence. In the control treatments CO individual ac-
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accuracy increased (in JE and EJE). On the other hand, it decreased, when accuracy
did not improve (in EE). In our experiment, subjects did not receive feedback on
their accuracy. The same direction in the changes of accuracy and confidence that
we found suggested that people have a good intuition about their own performance.
Table 3.2 presents regression results, where individual accuracy changes (∆aiq)
and individual confidence changes (∆ciq) are regressed on treatment dummy vari-
ables, with the control treatment (CO) as the reference group. Fixed effect for each
question was included, and standard errors were clustered at both question and in-
dividual level using the two-way clustering strategy of ?.
Results show no significant effect of answering evidence questions (ECO) on peo-
ple’s judgment quality at the individual level. Further, the exchange of estimate
alone (JE) does not improve individual accuracy. This finding does not contradict
the findings in the literature of advice taking, which reported positive influence of
communication on individual accuracy (Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000; Bonaccio and
Dalal, 2006). Studies in this literature often report the change in accuracy before
and after, without comparing to a control group. We also find significant increase in
absolute accuracy, if not compared to the control group (see figure 3.1), consistent
with the findings in the literature.
On the other hand, when exchange of estimate is coupled with evidence (EJE),
such communications improve individual accuracy. These results suggest that sub-
jects’ revised judgments are more accurate when provided access to others’ judg-
ments together with supplementary information that helps them better incorporate
the judgments they receive.
The improvement of individual accuracy in the EJE treatment could come from
the exchange of evidence alone. Receiving supportive evidence from others without
their corresponding judgments or eliciting supportive evidence alone could provide
information to the receivers to rethink and improve their own judgments. Our results
were against both conjectures. The improvement of accuracy in the ECO and EE
treatments was not higher than that in the CO treatment (see table 3.2), suggesting
that subjects could not effectively benefit from the evidence elicitation or evidence
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Table 3.2: Regression Results: Individual Level
Dependent variable:
∆ Accuracy ∆ Confidence
ECO −0.032 −0.073
(0.025) (0.060)
JE 0.022 0.190∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.063)
EE −0.047 −0.120
(0.030) (0.088)
EJE 0.052∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.067)
Observations 3,660 3,646
R2 0.003 0.021
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
exchange.
Another possibility is that receiving evidence which reminds subjects of their lim-
ited knowledge may lead them to adjust their estimates upward. If they tend to un-
derestimate initially, such upward adjustment will lead to more accurate judgments.
Again, we did not find surpport for this conjecture. The proportion of underestima-
tion did not change in the EE treatment (from 72% to 71%, p=0.32 in McNemar
test). One possible explanation of people’s no response to the evidence information
provided by others is that, when faced with the rather ambiguous evidence provided
by others, subjects interpreted it as evidence supporting their own judgments (Lord
et al., 1979; Plous, 1991), leading to little adjustment of their own initial judgments.
After ruling out the explanation of the pure effects from eliciting evidence and ex-
changing evidence, we attribute the improvement of individual accuracy in the EJE
treatment to the combination of estimate and evidence exchange. We conjecture
that, when evidence was coupled with others’ estimate, people can better evaluate
the quality of others’ judgments, leading to better judgment revisions. “Egocentric
discounting”, a systematic bias of giving inadequate weights to others’ judgments
(Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000), has often been documented in the literature. Fol-
lowing the definition in the literature, for individual i who receives the estimate
from individual i′ (i′ 6= i), the weight individual i puts on her own estimate is
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Table 3.3: Regression Results: Crowd Level
Dependent variable:
∆ Accuracy ∆ EP ∆ Diversity
ECO 0.013 0.004 0.120
(0.033) (0.020) (0.110)
JE 0.046 0.005 0.017
(0.033) (0.020) (0.110)
EE 0.029 −0.006 0.150
(0.033) (0.020) (0.110)
EJE 0.063∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.094
(0.033) (0.020) (0.110)
Observations 75 75 75
R2 0.075 0.110 0.046
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
in accuracy the “social influence effect”, where “[groups] engage in a convergence
process that does not yield improvements of the collective.” Our findings on the effect
of judgment and evidence exchange (EJE) suggest that this form of communication is
not susceptible to the social influence effect. In everyday communication, judgments
are exchanged often with supporting evidence and arguments. Our findings show
that “social influence” would not always lead to the undesirable convergence to a
wrong judgment as suggested by Lorenz et al. (2011).
Further, apart from the increase in crowd accuracy, there were increases in the
elite percentage2 in the EJE treatment. The findings on the elite percentage gave
us more information on the quality of the judgments in the crowd. With more
individuals with high accuracy, the group judgment aggretation is more likely to go
in the right direction.
3.3.3 Summary and Discussion
We found that communication with both judgment and evidence has a positive
impact on the quality of judgment at both the individual and crowd levels. Our find-
ings suggest that, when consulting the opinion of a committee, exchanging judgments
2This finding is robust to different thresholds: l = 0.2 and l = 0.4.
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among its members coupled with their most valuable information (valuable in the
sense of being least likely to be shared by other members) can help the group form
a better judgment. After sharing judgments and (potentially) idiosyncratic informa-
tion with each other, the group may still preserve its diversity in opinions, but at the
same time arrive at a better average judgment and have more individuals with high
accuracy. With these aspects improved, the group is more likely to arrive at a more
accurate judgment, and hence at a socially and economically more efficient decision.
Our findings also suggest that communication with only judgment or with only
evidence is not ideal. Neither of these communication forms provide information
that others can utilize in forming a better judgment. The latter, communication with
evidence alone, even undermined individual accuracy. The former has a psychological
side effect of boosting individual confidence not matched by the improvement in the
judgment qualities.
The out-performance of communication of judgment with supporting evidence
over the other two forms of communication may stem from the observation that
people can better appreciate (assigned more weight to) others’ judgments when they
were accompanied by supporting evidence. The accompanying evidence can serve
as an extra cue on the accuracy of others’ judgments, helping people make better
use of others’ judgments in the revision process than when such evidence is absent.
In certain cases, evidence may also explain the differences between their own and
others’ judgments. However, when evidence was provided without others’ judgment,
people may not be able to interpret the evidence in the right direction. As suggested
by Lord et al. (1979) and Plous (1991), people may interpret the same ambiguous
information as evidence supporting their own judgments, going even further in their
already wrong direction.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper made a first attempt to better simulate real life communication by
incorporating not only judgment but also supporting evidence as the information
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content of communication in a controlled manner. Using proper controls, we find
that exactly this extra piece of information improves judgment quality.
Our findings have implications on communication of judgments and opinions in
general. If you have an opinion, then support it with your arguments. It helps others
to better appreciate it.
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Chapter 4
Comparing risk aversion when
beliefs differ
4.1 Introduction
Consider two decision makers, person A and person B. Imagine that we want to
compare the degree of risk aversion between these two individuals. Under risk (known
probabilities) we can say that person A is more risk averse than person B if person A
rejects all bets that person B rejects.1 Under expected utility (EU) this is equivalent
to saying that person A has more concave utility than person B. Under uncertainty,
however, things are less straightforward. Yaari (1969) showed that under subjective
expected utility (SEU), A rejecting all bets that person B rejects is equivalent to A
having more concave utility than B and them sharing the same beliefs. A large body
of work has used this approach to define comparative risk aversion, or has expanded
This chapter is based on the paper “Comparing uncertainty aversion towards different sources”,
co-authored with Aurélien Baillon and Dennie van Dolder.
1As noted by Yaari (1969), it would be both more accurate and more cumbersome to say that
person A is at least as risk averse as person B. For sake of brevity, we will follow Yaari and simply
say that person A is more risk averse than person B.
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on by constructing comparative definitions of uncertainty/ambiguity and loss aversion
(Kihlstrom and Mirman, 1974; Roth, 1985; Epstein, 1999; Nau, 2003; Köbberling and
Wakker, 2005; Nau, 2006; Olszewski, 2007; Blavatskyy, 2011; Jewitt and Mukerji,
2011; Bommier et al., 2012; Chambers and Echenique, 2012). The restriction that
the two individuals share the same beliefs is, however, highly restrictive as individuals
will often hold different beliefs when assessing the likelihood of particular events.
In this chapter, we propose definitions of comparative risk aversion for people who
hold different beliefs. Without placing any constraints on beliefs, all our definitions
are necessary for A to have more concave utility than B under subjective expected
utility. Furthermore, they are sufficient for A having more concave utility than B
under additional, relatively weak, belief assumptions.
Next to comparing risk aversion between individuals holding different beliefs, our
definitions also give more leeway to study how an individual’s risk preferences vary
across conditions. As noted by Yaari (1969), person A and person B can refer to the
same person at, for instance, different wealth levels or different information levels.
However, with Yaari’s definition such a comparison required that the conditions under
consideration did not affect the individual’s beliefs regarding the likelihood of events.
This is problematic when comparing the same person at different information levels as
it would contradict Bayesian updating. By letting go of this same belief requirement,
our definitions allow for the comparison of an individual’s risk preferences across
conditions that do affect beliefs.
Besides relaxing the same belief requirement, most of our definitions do not even
require that person A and B face the same event space. This property creates fur-
ther opportunities to compare risk aversion both between and within individuals.
Between individuals, it allows us to compare risk aversion of individuals operating
on different markets. For example, not only can we tell whether A or B is more risk
averse when trading on the Dow Jones Index, we can also compare the risk aversion
of person A who is trading on the Dow Jones to that of person B who is trading on
the Nikkei. Within an individual, our definitions can be used to study an individual’s
source preferences. A large body of work suggests that people prefer to bet on some
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sources of uncertainties over others (Ellsberg, 1961; Heath and Tversky, 1991; Keppe
and Weber, 1995; Tversky and Fox, 1995; Resende and Wu, 2010; Abdellaoui et al.,
2011). Models capturing source preference through source-dependent utility have
been proposed by Kreps and Porteus (1978) when sources are different time points
and by Klibanoff et al. (2005), Nau (2006), and Neilson (2010) to study ambiguity
attitudes. Chew et al. (2008) investigate source-dependent utility in a neuroimaging
experiment.2 Our conditions can be used to compare the concavity of the utility
of a person for different sources of uncertainty, without assuming that probabili-
ties are known (unlike Kreps and Porteus, 1978) or that subjective probabilities are
observable (unlike Klibanoff et al., 2005).
Yaari’s condition can be extended to Hansen and Sargent (2001) multiplier prefer-
ences model in order to compare policy makers’ confidence in the model they employ
to define their policies (or alternatively: their concern for model misspecification).
With Yaari’s original condition, this was only possible if the policy makers had the
same baseline model (Baillon et al., 2014). Our definitions allow for comparisons
between agents with different baseline models, possibly facing different situations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
theoretical framework and Yaari’s original results. Section 4.3 presents our main
definitions for binary acts. Section 4.4 extends these definitions to general acts and
Section 4.5 shows how our definitions can be used to compare risk attitudes across
sources of uncertainty and Section 4.6 describes how they can be employed to compare
policy makers’ concern for model specification under multiplier preferences. Section
4.7 concludes the chapter. The proofs of the propositions in this chapter can be
found in Appendix III.
4.2 Background
Let S be a finite or infinite state space, containing all states of nature s. The
agents do not know which state is true. An event E is a subset of S. Let the set of
2See Baillon et al. (2012) for a discussion of the descriptive appropriateness of utility to capture
source preference.
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events considered by the agent be a sigma-algebra denoted Σ. The complementary
event of E is denoted Ec and {Ei}n denotes a partition of S in n events. The outcome
set is X, an open interval of the reals. The agents can choose between acts, which
are finite Σ-measurable mappings from S to X. Acts are typically denoted f or g
and the set of all acts is F . We write f = (E1 : x1, · · · , En : xn) to indicate that f
assigns outcome xi to event Ei for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The bet xEy is a binary act yielding
outcome x if event E occurs and y otherwise. When x > y, we call xEy a bet on
E and yEx a bet against E. Acts that yield the same outcome z for all s ∈ S are
referred to as z.
Agent i ∈ {A,B} has preferences %i over F , with ∼i, i, ≺i, and -i defined as
usual. We will say that %i satisfies subjective expected utility (SEU) if there exist a
countably additive subjective probability measure Pi and a continuous and strictly
increasing utility function ui uniquely defined up to an affine transformation such
that f %i g ⇔
∫
S
Pi(s)ui (f(s)) ds ≥
∫
S
Pi(s)ui (g(s)) ds. We will say that uA is
more concave than uB if there exists a concave function ϕ such that uA = ϕ ◦ uB .
Finally, we will say that Pi is nonatomic if for all E ∈ Σ such that Pi(E) > 0, there
exists F ∈ Σ such that F ⊂ E and 0 < Pi(F ) < Pi(E). Nonatomicity is guaranteed,
for instance, by Savage’s (1954) axiomatization of SEU.
For Yaari (1969), A is more risk averse than B if, starting from the same initial
situation, the acceptance set of A is a subset of the acceptance set of B. Figure 4.1
illustrates this. Axes represents the outcomes that events E and Ec yield. Indiffer-
ence curves of A and B that cross the diagonal at z are the acceptance frontiers of
both agents at situation z. Among all bets on and against E, A’s acceptance set at
z (striped area) is a subset of B’s (shaded area). Any bet that B will not accept will
also not be accepted by A. Formally, z %B xEy ⇒ not[z ≺A xEy].
Under subjective expected utility, the slope of the tangent of an indifference curve
where it crosses the diagonal is equal to minus the odds for E, i.e. − Pi(E)1−Pi(E) . If agents
A and B have different beliefs, their indifference curves will have different tangents
at z and will therefore cross each other (assuming differentiability). Hence, there will
exist a bet that A accepts and B does not and another bet that B accepts and A
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Pi(E)→ 1
Pi(E)→ 0z
xEy
yEx
E
Ec
Figure 4.2: Effect of beliefs
4.3 Relaxing the "same belief" requirement for bi-
nary acts
Figure 4.2 shows how the acceptance frontier at z is affected by changes in beliefs.
If agent i is certain that E will occur (Pi(E) = 1), she will be indifferent to any change
of outcomes on Ec and her acceptance frontier will be vertical. It will be horizontal
in the opposite case (Pi(E) = 0). A switch to a higher Pi(E) will make a bet on
E (e.g., xEy) more attractive, but will make the symmetric bet against E (yEx)
less attractive. We propose to use this effect of changes in beliefs to adapt Yaari’s
definition of "more risk averse".
We say that A is more risk averse than B if there are no pairs of symmetric bets
on and against E that B would not accept while A would. In terms of acceptance
set, it means that if A’s acceptance set exceeds B’s below the diagonal, it should
not exceed it in the symmetric region above the diagonal. Figure 4.3.a illustrates
such a case, while Figure 4.3.b displays a counter-example (in both figures, agents A
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have probability of 12 . In other words: we need them to agree on a “fair coin”. Note
that we do not require them to agree on all events with probability 12 . If PA and
PB are nonatomic, requiring them to agree on all events with probability 12 would
be equivalent to requiring that PA and PB are identical, as was shown by Marinacci
(2002, Theorem 2). The richness requirement of proposition 1 may still be deemed
too demanding and we will therefore propose a way to relax it.
Assume that on Figures 4.1 and 4.3, the axes represent the outcomes obtained
on event F and F c for A and on E and Ec for B (for some arbitrary E and F ). If
PA(F ) = PB(E), our definition would draw the same conclusion as comparing which
acceptance set, between A’s and B’s, is a subset of the other one. If PA(F ) 6= PB(E),
the acceptance frontiers would cross each other but our definition could still work.
It would say that if there are some outcomes x and y such that B would accept
neither xEy nor yEx, then A should not find both xF y and yFx acceptable. If the
two end points of the gauge from xEy to yEx do not fit in B’s acceptance set, the
end points of the equivalent gauge from xF y to yFx (the scale on the axes being the
same) should not fit in A’s. These gauge lines allow us to compare acceptance sets
for bets on different events.
Proposition 2. Assume %A and %B satisfy subjective expected utility:
(i) ∀ E,F ∈ Σ, and x, y, and z in X,
[z %B xEy & z %B yEx] ⇒ not[z ≺A xF y & z ≺A yFx] .
(ii) uA is more concave than uB.
(i) is necessary for (ii). It is also sufficient if there exist E,F ∈ Σ such that PA(F ) =
PB(E) =
1
2 .
Statement (i) is necessary and sufficient to compare the utility functions of A
and B if both agents assign probability 12 to some, possibly different, events. No
agreement is required anymore. The existence of such events only requires the state
space to be rich enough. This richness condition is automatically satisfied if PA and
PB are nonatomic, as follows from Savage’s (1954) axiomatization. In the following,
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we will further weaken the richness requirement on the state space by considering
general acts instead of bets.
Observation 1. If, in Proposition 2, PA and PB are nonatomic, then (i) is equiva-
lent to (ii).
4.4 Extension 1: Comparing risk aversion with gen-
eral acts
To adapt the notion of more risk averse to general acts, we can consider what
happens to two events only for each agent and keep everything else (what happens
on the other events) constant. For acts with three outcomes, the acceptance sets can
be represented on a 3D graph. We can keep the outcome on one state constant (we
"slice" the acceptance set) to obtain 2D acceptance sets and use similar gauges as
above (see Figure 4.4.a). Proposition 3 applies this approach. We denote xEyF f the
act yielding x on E, y on F , and f(s) for all s /∈ E ∪ F .
Proposition 3. Assume %A and %B satisfy subjective expected utility:
(i) ∀ E,F,G,H ∈ Σ, f, g ∈ F , and x, y, and z in X,
[zE∪F f %B xEyF f & zE∪F f %B yExF f ]⇒ not[zG∪Hg ≺A xGyHg & zG∪Hg ≺A
yGxHg].
(ii) uA is more concave than uB.
(i) is necessary for (ii). It is also sufficient if there exist E,F,G,H ∈ Σ such that
PB(E) = PB(F ) and PA(G) = PA(H).
As can be seen, we have weakened the richness requirement on the state space:
it is no longer necessary that each agent finds two complementary events that are
equally likely; it only requires two equally likely events for each agent.
In all statements (i) above, we permuted two outcomes to build gauges. We can
also permute all outcomes of the act. If the acts have three outcomes, we obtain
six permutations and a gauge hexagon (see Figure 4.4.b). Agent A is then more
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Proposition 4. Assume %A and %B satisfy subjective expected utility:
(i) ∀ f, g ∈ F yielding the same outcomes (x1, . . . , xn) and for all z ∈ X,
[z %B Π(f) ∀Π] ⇒ not [z ≺A Π(g) ∀Π].
(ii) uA is more concave than uB.
(i) is necessary for (ii). It is also sufficient if there exist, for some integer n, two
n-fold partitions {Ei}n and {Fi}n of S such that PA(Fi) = PB(Ei) = 1n for all
i ∈ {1, · · · , n}.
We can also decide not to consider all permutations, but only those which "max-
imally differ" from each other. For three-outcome acts, we can consider only three
corners of the hexagon which differ in all coordinates. We obtain such a triangle (see
Figure 4.4.c). We can obtain this triangle by using one type of permutation that we
will call cyclic. Consider the act f = (E1 : x1, E2 : x2, · · · , En−1 : xn−1, En : xn). Let
pi be a cyclic permutation function, defined as pi(f) = (E1 : x2, E2 : x3, · · · , En−1 :
xn, En : x1). It moves each outcome one event to the left. We denote pim the
compound function that applies pi m times. For instance, pi3 = pi ◦ pi ◦ pi.
Proposition 5. Assume %A and %B satisfy subjective expected utility:
(i) ∀ f, g ∈ F yielding the same outcomes (x1, . . . , xn) and for all z ∈ X,
[z %B pim(f) ∀m ∈ {1, · · · , n}] ⇒ not [z ≺A pim(f) ∀m ∈ {1, · · · , n}].
(ii) uA is more concave than uB.
(i) is necessary for (ii). It is also sufficient if there exist, for some integer n, two
n-fold partitions {Ei}n and {Fi}n of S such that PA(Fi) = PB(Ei) = 1n for all
i ∈ {1, · · · , n}.
In Propositions 4 and 5, the additional requirement for (i) to be sufficient for (ii)
is stronger than that of Proposition 3. The approach of Proposition 3 is therefore
the least demanding in terms of richness of the state space(s) and beliefs of the
decision makers. For all three propositions, the requirements are trivially satisfied
by nonatomic probability measures.
55
Observation 2. If, in Proposition 3, 4 and 5, PA and PB are nonatomic, then (i)
is equivalent to (ii).
4.5 Extension 2: Comparing risk aversion across sources
of uncertainty
In his seminal work Ellsberg (1961) provides convincing examples suggesting that
individuals will prefer to bet on risk over uncertainty. In his simplest example, people
prefer to bet on an urn with 50 red and 50 black balls over an urn containing a 100
red or black balls in unknown proportions, irrespective of the winning color. While
Ellsberg presented this as a though experiment, subsequent work has convincingly
shown his intuition to be correct (Camerer and Weber, 1992). Further work suggests
that people prefer to bet on sources of uncertainty for which they feel competent,
and can prefer uncertainty over risk in such cases (Heath and Tversky, 1991; Keppe
and Weber, 1995; Tversky and Fox, 1995; Resende and Wu, 2010). Such tendencies
are not without consequence in the real world. In finance, it is a well-known pattern
that people tend to invest and trade more in their own country than we would expect
given the gains to be had from diversification (French and Poterba, 1991; Obstfeld
et al., 2001). This home bias can be explained by a preference to take risk on more
familiar sources of uncertainty (Kasa, 2000; Kilka and Weber, 2000; Uppal and Wang,
2003; Huang, 2008). Sources of uncertainty have been used in theoretical studies of
ambiguity, in which decision makers face two stages of uncertainty (Nau, 2006; Ergin
and Gul, 2009; Strzalecki, 2011), one of these stages possibly being risky (Klibanoff
et al., 2005).
From Proposition 2 on, we allowed agent A and agent B to bet on different events
from the same state space S. We can also assume they are facing different sources
of uncertainty SA and SB , with their respective ΣA, ΣB , FA, and FB . Below we
adapt our second proposition, apart from Proposition 1, all other propositions can
be adapted in a similar fashion.
Proposition 6. Assume %A and %B satisfy subjective expected utility:
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(i) ∀ F ∈ ΣA, E ∈ ΣB, and x, y, and z in X,
[z %B xEy & z %B yEx] ⇒ not[z ≺A xF y & z ≺A yFx] .
(ii) uA is more concave than uB.
(i) is necessary for (ii). It is also sufficient if there exist F ∈ ΣA and E ∈ ΣB such
that PA(F ) = PB(E) = 12 .
This allows us to compare risk aversion between agents facing different sources
of uncertainty, for example operating on different markets. Furthermore, A and
B could refer to the same agent facing different sources of uncertainty. For each
agent, we can then characterize her willingness to take risk across different sources of
uncertainty. We could rank these sources in terms of the agent’s willingness to take
risk and compare the decision maker’s willingness to take risk in each source to the
case of known probabilities to classify a decision maker as ambiguity seeking, neutral
or averse towards a given source.
4.6 Extension 3: Comparing robustness of policies
under model uncertainty
When formulating policies to achieve specific aims, policy makers need to have
some kind of model in mind (either explicitly or implicitly) that defines the likelihood
of particular outcomes to result from different policies. Policy makers will generally
face considerable uncertainty regarding the correct model.
In the following, we consider two policy makers maximizing the same objective
function W (defined over X) representing, for instance, well-being. Hansen and
Sargent (2001) proposed multiplier preferences to model a policy maker who wants
to make decisions robust to possible misspecification of the model (s)he uses to define
policies. The policy maker’s follows the decision rule Vi(f) = min
p∈∆(S)
∫
S
W (f(s))dp(s)+
θiR(P ||Qi) where ∆(S) is the set of all countably additive probability measures on
(S,Σ), the function R(P ||Q) is the relative entropy of P with respect to Q, Qi is
the policy maker’s baseline model, and θi ≥ 0 represents the degree of confidence
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the policy maker has in the baseline model (or alternatively: the concern she has
for model misspecification). If θi is small, the agent will give considerable weight to
alternative models. If θi tends to infinity, the agent fully accepts the baseline model.
Yaari’s condition permits a comparison of θi, but only if both policy makers have
the same baseline model (Baillon et al., 2014). Our conditions extend the comparison
to agents with different baseline models. Proposition 7 shows how we can adapt
Proposition 2 to multiplier preferences.
Proposition 7. Assume %A and %B are multiplier preferences:
(i) ∀ E,F ∈ Σ, and x, y, and z in X,
[z %B xEy & z %B yEx] ⇒ not[z ≺A xF y & z ≺A yFx] .
(ii) θA ≤ θB.
(i) is necessary for (ii). It is also sufficient if there exists E,F ∈ Σ such that
QA(F ) = QB(E) =
1
2 .
All other propositions discussed above can also be directly applied to multiplier
preferences by replacing their respective condition (ii) by that of Proposition 7. As
extension 3 has shown, we can also have events from different sources of uncertainty
and therefore compare the decisions of a policy maker in one situation with those
(s)he made in another situation with different model uncertainty.
4.7 Conclusion and Discussion
There are many instances when we want to compare risk aversion between decision
makers. When probabilities are known, this is a straightforward exercise as person
A being more risk averse than person B can be defined as person A rejecting all
gambles that person B rejects. Under expected utility, this choice pattern implies
that person A has more concave utility than person B. When probabilities are
unknown, the rejection of a bet is no longer determined by risk aversion alone, but also
by subjective beliefs regarding the likelihood of uncertain events. Under subjective
expected utility, Yaari (1969) showed that person A rejecting all gambles that person
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B rejects is equivalent to A having more concave utility than B and A and B sharing
the same beliefs. This latter assumption narrows down the domain in which risk
aversion can be compared as beliefs about the likelihood of uncertain events may
very well differ across individuals, and even for the same individual across different
conditions.
In the this chapter, we proposed a number of definitions that can be used to
compare risk aversion of person A and B without assuming that they hold the same
beliefs. Without any constraints on belief, all our definitions imply that A has more
concave utility than B under subjective expected utility. Additional, relatively weak,
belief assumptions make our definitions sufficient for A having more concave utility
than B.
Being able to compare risk aversion between decision makers for cases when prob-
abilities are unknown is important as almost all real world scenarios fall in this cat-
egory. An individual’s risk preferences under known, exogenously given probabilities
are likely to be a poor proxy for her risk preferences towards other sources of un-
certainty, as an individual’s willingness to take risk tends to differ across different
sources of uncertainty (Ellsberg, 1961; Heath and Tversky, 1991; Keppe and Weber,
1995; Tversky and Fox, 1995; Resende and Wu, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). If
person A is more risk averse than person B when facing gambles with known prob-
abilities, this does not automatically imply that person A will be more risk averse
than person B when investing on the Dow Jones. Our definitions allow us to compare
risk aversion towards specific sources of uncertainty between decision makers without
imposing that they hold the same beliefs.
Most of our definitions do not require that person A and B face the same event
space. This allows us to compare risk aversion between decision makers facing differ-
ent sources of uncertainty. For example, we can compare the risk aversion of person
A and person B trading on different financial markets. Not only does this relax-
ation make our definitions applicable to a broader domain, but also allows for more
informative comparisons. Consider comparing risk preferences regarding the stock
market for investors from different countries. One option would be to compare their
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risk preferences on a single market, such as the Dow Jones. However, such a mar-
ket will potentially have a substantial different meaning for investors from different
countries. As a result, it will arguably be more informative to compare the investors’
willingness to take risk on markets that carry similar meaning to the investors, such
as their respective home markets.
In addition to opening up opportunities to compare risk aversion between in-
dividuals holding different beliefs, our definitions are suitable for studying how an
individual’s risk preference varies across conditions that affect beliefs. One example is
information level. If people adopt Bayesian updating, the same individual would hold
different beliefs at different levels of information. Our definition allows for compar-
isons of one’s risk aversion across conditions that influence beliefs. Furthermore, the
fact that person A and person B do not have to face the same event space opens up
the possibility to map an individual’s source preferences. In particular, our method
allows for the ranking of sources of uncertainty on the basis of the decision maker’s
willingness to take risk under each source. Our conditions allow for comparing utility
between sources of uncertainty and thereby complement the definitions of Tversky
and Wakker (1995), which allowed for comparing decision weights between sources
of uncertainty in non-expected utility models.
Finally, Yaari’s condition has previously been extended to compare policy mak-
ers’ confidence in the model they use to define policies. Due to the restrictions on
beliefs, however, this was only possible between policy makers that share the same
baseline model (Baillon et al., 2014). Our conditions allow to draw this comparison
between agents who have different baseline models, possibly facing different situations
altogether.
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Chapter 5
Individual risk attitudes and
the effects of payment
instruments
5.1 Introduction
Nowadays, consumers are indulged with many payment instruments: cash, checks,
debit cards, credit cards, online/mobile banking, Apple Pay, etc. Cash is no longer
the most common payment instrument in Europe or in the U.S. (Bagnall et al.,
2014). Non-cash payment instruments enable consumers to make payments without
exchange of cash notes, which substantially simplify the payment process. Non-cash
payment instruments obviously change how we pay. What is not as obvious but no
less important is, they also change how much we pay.
When payments are made in cash, consumers tend to spend less (Hirschman,
1979; Feinberg, 1986). Even for hypothetical questions, consumers cued with credit
This chapter is based on the homonymous paper, co-authored with Yu Gao.
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card logo in sight are willing to spend more and have shorter decision time (Feinberg,
1986; Raghubir and Srivastava, 2008).The substantial gap between cash and non-cash
payment cannot be fully explained by the convenience and potential money saving of
credit-card usage. A behavioral explanation explains the gap because the thoughts
of payment can undermine the pleasures of consumption, and the psychological dis-
tance created by non-cash payment could alleviate the pain of paying (Prelec and
Loewenstein, 1998).
To test the effects in incentivized transactions of high value, Prelec and Simester
(2001) conducted experiments comparing consumers’ willingness-to-pay for tickets to
sporting events with different payment instruments. Consistent with the literature,
consumers were willing to pay substantially more with their credit card. The large
credit card premium (up to 100%) could not plausibly be explained by liquidity con-
straints. However, the effect seemed to depend on the characteristics of the products
under valuation. In their second study, subjects were asked to value products of
either certain (a restaurant gift certificate) or unknown market value (tickets to a
sold-out sporting event, for which the value was unstated). The gap between cash
and non-cash instruments only existed for the products with unknown market value,
but not for those with certain market value.
If the effects of payment instruments are moderated by the feeling of uncertainty,
the question arises as to the channel through which the payment instruments work.
Prelec and Simester (2001) did not provide a theory explaining the presence of the
observed effect. In this chapter, we propose that payment instruments change val-
uations of lotteries by shaping consumers’ risk attitudes. In particular, consumers’
probability weighting might be affected by payment instruments in two ways. On the
one hand, payment instruments could affect consumers’ allocation of their attention.
As Kahneman (2011) put it, “our mind has a useful capability to focus on whatever
is odd, different or unusual”. The attention paid to the colorful cash occupies cog-
nitive resources. Different notes and coins make it one step harder to calculate EV
of the lottery. The depletion of cognitive resources reduce people’s reliance on the
analytic, calculating, and deliberative part, the so called “System 2”, and rely more
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on the instinctive “System 1”. Therefore people would be less sensitive to proba-
bility differences. On the other hand, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein
et al., 2001) postulates that responses to risky situations result in part from direct
emotional influences, including negative feelings such as worry, fear, or anxiety, and
such feelings can be influenced by how an outcome is presented (vividness). Com-
pared with non-cash presented lotteries, cash presented ones might trigger stronger
anticipatory emotions and therefore make people more pessimistic towards risk.
We test the hypotheses above using a controlled laboratory experiment. We
ask the subjects to value lotteries with known probabilities under two treatments,
one with cash and the other with a non-cash instrument (number). We found that
the valuations given by subjects in the cash treatment were lower than those in
the number treatment. We use a binary rank-dependent utility (RDU) model to
explain the certainty equivalents (CEs) given under the two treatments. Since we
used binary lotteries in the experiment, many non-expected utility theories do not
diverge (Gul, 1991; Luce and Fishburn, 1991; Miyamoto, 1988), and therefore the
results from binary RDU also apply to them. By eliciting the parameters of the utility
function and probability weighting function under each treatment, we identified that
the gap in CEs between the treatments was due to the difference in probability
weighting functions under the cash and non-cash treatments. Subjects were less
sensitive to changes in likelihood when valuing cash lotteries, but there is no difference
in pessimism.
5.2 Experimental design
Ninety-two students at Erasmus University Rotterdam participated in the exper-
iment (37% female). Each subject received a show-up fee of e5. On top of that,
each subject received additional payment (up to e30) determined by their choice in
a randomly drawn question answered in the experiment.
Subjects were assigned to one of the two treatments randomly, and were inter-
viewed individually by one of the two researchers randomly determined, independent
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of the treatment. In each session, the researcher presented a series of lotteries to the
subject, and recorded the subject’s valuation of each one. To familiarize subjects
with the tasks and payment procedure, the instructions contained examples and trial
problems. The subjects could ask the researcher clarification questions any time
during the experiment. To minimize the difference between the two researchers, a
strict protocol (see Appendix IV) about what to tell subjects and how to answer
their questions was adopted. Subjects could work at their own speed. On average,
it took them 45 minutes to complete the experiment.
In both treatments, subjects were asked to give valuations to binary lotteries. We
denote L = xpy (with x > y > 0). The lottery gave the subject the better outcome
x with probability p, and y otherwise. There were in total 12 such lotteries, varying
p, x and y (see Table 5.1). Such variation enables us to estimate the utility function
and the probability weighting function for each subject. The lotteries appeared in
individualized random orders.
Table 5.1: The lotteries used in the valuation task
p x y
1 0.05 20 5
2 0.05 30 10
3 0.1 10 5
4 0.25 20 5
5 0.25 30 10
6 0.5 10 5
7 0.5 20 5
8 0.75 20 5
9 0.75 30 10
10 0.9 10 5
11 0.95 20 5
12 0.95 30 10
We implemented the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure (Becker et al.,
1964) to elicit CEs for lotteries with compatible incentives. First, the lottery to
be implemented for real was randomly determined at the end of the experiment.
Second, the BDM procedure was conducted by drawing one number z between the
lowest prize (y) and the highest prize (x) of the chosen lottery. If z was larger than
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Subjects were asked to either specify their evaluation to the lottery by writing
down the number in the number treatment, or put down the corresponding amount
of cash below the lottery in the cash treatment. Particularly, subjects in the cash
treatment were given a box with one e20 note, one e10 note, one e5 note, two
e2 coins, one e1 coin, one 50-cent coin, two 20-cent coins and one 10-cent coin in
it, so that they can make different combinations to present all possible evaluations
(precision up to 10 cents) to lotteries, ranging from e41 to 0.
5.3 Analysis
5.3.1 Decision-model-free Analyses
We analyze the reported CEs without assuming any specific decision model. We
use a simple linear mixed-effects model, with fixed effects of treatments and task
dummies and with subject random effect. The certainty equivalent of lottery j given
by subject i is modeled as: CEij = βTreatmenti + δj + ij , where i = 1, ..., 92, j =
1, ..., 12, and ij is a normally distributed within-subject error term.
We also calculate Relative Risk Premium (RRP = (EV−CE)EV ) for each valuation.
The positive, zero, and negative RRPs suggest risk aversion, risk neutrality and risk
seeking respectively. We model the RRPs with the same mixed effect model as the
one for CE above: RRPij = βTreatmenti + δj + ij , where i = 1, , 92, j = 1, , 12, and
ij is a normally distributed within-subject error term.
5.3.2 Binary RDU analysis
Under binary RDU, for a given binary lottery L = xpy (x > y ≥ 0), the CE shall
satisfy: CE = u−1(w(p)u(x)+(1−w(p))u(y)) (Eq. 5.1), where u is a utility function,
with u(0) = 0 and u′(x) > 0, describing how a monetary outcome x is subjectively
valued, and w is an increasing probability weighting function that assigns subjective
weight to probabilities, with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1.
note, one e2 coin and one e1 coin.
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Stott (2006) compared combinations of different utility functions and weighting
functions for choice data, and found that the combination of power utility function
(Wakker, 2008) and the compound invariance family (Prelec, 1998) the most pre-
dictive. We use the power utility function u(x) = xγ if γ > 0; lnx if γ = 0; −xγ
if γ < 0 (Eq. 5.2), and Prelec’s compound invariant probability weighting function
w(p) = ((exp(−(− ln p)a))b (0 < a < 1, b > 0) (Eq. 5.3) to analyze our data. In
particular, we use Prelec’s two parameter probability weighting function that de-
composes probability weighting into likelihood-sensitivity and pessimism.
The parameter a is an index of likelihood-sensitivity, which points to a psycholog-
ical phenomenon which reflects “diminishing sensitivity” for probabilities. A smaller
a indicates less distinction between different levels of likelihood. The parameter b is
an index of pessimism, and a bigger b indicates that the subject pays more attention
to the worst outcome.
Using maximum-likelihood estimation, we estimate Eq. 5.1 with the specific u
and w for each individual separately, and obtain parameters γ, a, and b for each
individual. We will compare the estimates to their benchmark and between the two
treatments using Wilcoxon tests.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Decision-model-free Analyses
Table 5.2 shows the means (and standard deviations) of CEs for each lottery in
the two treatments. The EVs, winning probability of the larger outcome, the mean
differences between treatments normalized by EVs of the lotteries are also provided
in the table.
It can be observed that CEs in the number treatment are larger than CEs in the
cash treatment for every lottery. As described in Section 5.3.1, we subject the CEs
to a linear mixed-effects model. The model shows that the CEs in the cash treatment
are on average 0.77 euro lower than those in the number treatment (p = 0.002).
If look at the columns of EV and DifferenceEV , an increasing trend can be detected:
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be reflected by utility curvature and probability weighting.
The results show that valuators’ utility functions elicited for cash and non-cash
payment instruments do not differ from each other. The difference in valuations
is driven by probability weighting. Presenting lotteries with cash makes valuators
less sensitive to changes in likelihood, which leads to less variation in valuations of
different lotteries.
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Chapter 6
General Conclusion
This thesis presents evidence suggesting that the same types of biases in individual
decision making under uncertainty pertain in interpersonal contexts. The chapters
above demonstrate in specific contexts how specific interpersonal factors attenuate,
amplify, or replicate these biases.
One of the most natural interpersonal contexts is group decision making. The
group effects on decisions consist of aggregation and communication, and disentan-
gling these could help us improve our understanding of the group decision making
process and make better predictions. Because the two measures of rationality applied
in Chapter 2, namely stochastic dominance and EU-compliance, are both dichoto-
mous, we use the simulated decisions from pure voting as benchmarks to isolate the
communication effects. Identifying group communication effects in tasks with con-
tinuous variables, such as lottery valuation or matching probabilities, would be more
complicated. The challenge is to find a proper benchmark accounting for the pure ag-
gregation effects. To simulate the group valuation from pure voting, one would need
to make assumptions about the probability of one person voting for a given proposal
depending on her prior. An alternative way without making such assumptions is to
have a treatment where group members vote on individual valuations to determine
the group valuation.
The content of communication could make a lot of difference. Chapter 3 aims
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at providing simple information to help individuals evaluate the quality of the esti-
mates they received in interpersonal communication. The improvement of estimates,
after interpersonal exchange of information, depends on those with more accurate
estimates sticking more to their estimates than those with less accurate estimates.
Exchange of supporting evidence is one way to help individuals approximate the
comparative accuracy between their own estimates and the estimates they receive.
Chapter 4 extends Yaari’s definition of comparative risk aversion to enable com-
parisons between people holding different beliefs. The intuition behind our main
result is simple: in order to compare uncertainty aversion of two agents, one should
not onply consider their bets on events alone, since different beliefs about the events
are playing roles, but consider bets on and against events in pairs. The paired bets
together serve as a benchmark set that controls for confounding from unmeasured
different beliefs.
The last chapter presents evidence that the mere presentation with cash could
make a substantial psychological impact on people’s risk attitudes by changing their
likelihood insensitivity in probability weighting. The cash effects that lower val-
uations could potentially come from a buyer’s evolutionary instinct in bargaining
triggered by cash. Testing the existence of such instincts and, if they exist, finding
what triggers them could be complementary to the current study. Potentially, un-
derstanding such triggers could provide guidance for presenting uncertain prospects
(e.g., lotteries, insurance, or financial plans) in certain ways to tune the strings of
instincts to be ready for the melody of rationality.
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8. China has won in total medals at the 2012 Summer Olympics in
London.
9. There are currently in total NBA teams.
10. There are currently in total countries in Europe.
11. Water Margin has in total characters.
12. Tom Cruise has so far played in different movies.
13. Dream of the Red Chamber has in total characters.
14. Zhao Wei has so far played in different movies and TV dramas.
15. Zhang Yimou has so far directed movies.
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An example of a confidence question:
Please rate from 1 (not confident at all) to 7 (extremely confident) about how confi-
dent are you with your answer.
An example of an evidence question (for the first question of number of Asian
countries):
Please list three countries that you think others are most likely not able to think of:
a) b) c)
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Chapter 8
Appendix II: Experiment
instructions in Chapter 3
Thank you for your participation. This experiment consists of two stages.
During the first stage, you will fill in questionnaire 1 and also write down your
answers on a separate answer sheet. You have 25 minutes to complete this stage,
after which the experimenter will collect the questionnaire 1 and the answer sheet.
During the second stage, you will receive questionnaire 2 AND one of your class-
mates’ answer sheet from the previous stage. When filling in questionnaire 2, you
can refer to the answer sheet you received. You have 10 minutes to finish stage 2.
Afterwards, the experimenter will collect all documents and proceed to the payment
procedure.
Payment procedure:
Please fill the subject ID assigned to you in the top left corner blank on both
questionnaires and answer sheets. Questionnaires without a subject ID will not be
paid. At the end of the experiment, we will randomly draw 8 subject numbers.
Students with the 8 numbers will be paid according to the accuracies of their answer.
Others will receive 10 RMB show-up fee. Each student has an equal probability to
be drawn.
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In case your subject ID is drawn, please go to the payment desk, where you will
randomly draw a question number from the 30 questions (15 on Questionnaire 1
and 15 on Questionnaire 2). The experimenter will reveal the correct answer to the
question drawn and your payment will be determined as follows:
Your prize is 100 RMB if your answer is within the 5% interval around the correct
answer.
Your prize is 50 RMB if your answer is within the 10% interval but out of the 5%
interval around the correct answer.
Your prize is 20 RMB if your answer is within the 20% interval but out of the
10% interval around the correct answer.
Your prize is 10 RMB if your answer is out of the 20% interval around the correct
answer.
No communication is allowed during the experiment. Students who talk with
others will be disqualified from the experiment.
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Chapter 9
Appendix III: Proofs in
Chapter 4
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 1 can be obtained by replacing all F with E in the
following proof.
(ii)⇒ (i)
Proof. By the definition of "more concave", uA more concave than uB implies that
there exists a concave function ϕ such that uA = ϕ ◦ uB . Moreover, ϕ is strictly
increasing because uA and uB are strictly increasing.
Consider any z, x, y ∈ X and events E,F ∈ Σ. Without loss of generality, we assume
x ≥ y.
We first consider the case PB (E) ≥ PA (F ).
z %B xEy
⇒ uB (z) ≥ PB (E)uB (x) + (1− PB (E))uB (y)
⇒ uB (z) ≥ PA (F )uB (x) + (1− PA (F ))uB (y)
⇒ ϕ (uB (z)) ≥ PA (F )ϕ (uB (x)) + (1− PA (F ))ϕ (uB (y)) because ϕ is strictly in-
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creasing and concave
⇒ uA (z) ≥ PA (F )uA (x) + (1− PA (F ))uA (y)
⇒ z %A xF y
⇒ not [z ≺A xF y & z ≺A yFx]
The case PB (E) < PA (F ) can be derived in the same way by starting from z %B
yEx.
(i)⇒ (ii)
Below we prove not (ii) ⇒ not (i) if there exist E,F ∈ Σ such that PA(F ) =
PB(E) =
1
2 .
Proof. Remember that uA and uB are strictly increasing. We can therefore define ϕ
over the image of uB by ϕ = uA ◦ u−1B . Consequently, ϕ is also strictly increasing.
Not (ii)⇒ there exists b and c in the image of uB such that ϕ
(
1
2 (b+ c)
)
< 12ϕ (b) +
1
2ϕ (c)
Let x, y, z ∈ X be uniquely defined by uB (x) = b, uB (y) = c, uB (z) = b+c2 .
Consider an event E such that PB(E) = 12 (it must exist according to the richness
condition). Consequently, we have z ∼B xEy and z ∼B yEx
Now consider event F such that PA(F ) = 12 (it must also exist according to the
richness condition).
uA (z) = ϕ (uB (z)) = ϕ
(
1
2 (b+ c)
)
< 12ϕ (b) +
1
2ϕ (c) =
1
2uA(x) +
1
2uA(y)
= PA (F )uA(x) + (1− PA (F ))uA(y)
= (1− PA (F ))uA(x) + PA (F )uA(y)
⇒ uA (z) ≺A xEy and uA (z) ≺A yEx.
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9.2 Proof of Proposition 3
(ii)⇒ (i)
Proof. By the definition of "more concave", uA more concave than uB implies that
there exists a concave function ϕ such that uA = ϕ ◦ uB . Moreover, ϕ is strictly
increasing because uA and uB are strictly increasing.
Consider any z, x, y ∈ X, f, g ∈ F , and events E,F,G,H ∈ Σ. Without loss of
generality, we assume x ≥ y.
We first consider the case PB(E)(PB(E)+PB(F )) ≥
PA(G)
(PA(G)+PA(H))
.
zE∪F f %B xEyF f
⇒ uB (z) ≥ PB(E)(PB(E)+PB(F ))uB (x) +
PB(F )
(PB(E)+PB(F ))
uB (y)
⇒ uB (z) ≥ PA(G)(PA(G)+PA(H))uB (x) +
PA(H)
(PA(G)+PA(H))
uB (y)
⇒ ϕ (uB (z)) ≥ PA(G)(PA(G)+PA(H))ϕ (uB (x)) +
PA(H)
(PA(G)+PA(H))
ϕ (uB (y)) because ϕ is
strictly increasing and concave
⇒ uA (z) ≥ PA(G)(PA(G)+PA(H))uA (x) +
PA(H)
(PA(G)+PA(H))
uA (y)
⇒ zG∪Hg %A xGyHg
⇒ not[zG∪Hg ≺A xGyHg & zG∪Hg ≺A xHyGg].
The case PB(E)(PB(E)+PB(F )) <
PA(G)
(PA(G)+PA(H))
, can be derived in the same way by starting
from zE∪F f %B xF yEf .
(i)⇒ (ii)
Below we prove not (ii)⇒ not (i) if there exist E,F,G,H ∈ Σ such that PB(E) =
PB(F ) and PA(G) = PA(H).
Proof. Remember that uA and uB are strictly increasing. We can therefore define ϕ
over the image of uB by ϕ = uA ◦ u−1B . Consequently, ϕ is also strictly increasing.
Not (ii) ⇒ there exists b, c in the image of uB such that ϕ
(
1
2 (b+ c)
)
< 12ϕ (b) +
1
2ϕ (c).
Let outcomes x, y, z ∈ X be uniquely defined by uB (x) = b, uB (y) = c, uB (z) = b+c2 .
Consider events E,F such that PB(E) = PB(F ) (they must exist according to the
richness condition) and any act f . Consequently, we have zE∪F f ∼B xEyF f and
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zE∪F f ∼B xEyF f .
Now consider events G,H such that PA(G) = PA(H) (they must also exist according
to the richness condition) and any act g.
uA (z) = ϕ (uB (z)) = ϕ
(
1
2 (b+ c)
)
< 12ϕ (b) +
1
2ϕ (c) =
1
2uA(x) +
1
2uA(y)
⇒ (PA (G) + PA (H))uA (z) < PA (G)uA (x) + PA (H)uA (y)
and (PA (H) + PA (G))uA (z) < PA (H)uA (x) + PA (G)uA (y)
⇒ zG∪Hg ≺A xGyHg and zG∪Hyg ≺A xHyGg.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 4
(ii)⇒ (i)
Proof. By the definition of "more concave", uA more concave than uB implies that
there exists a concave function ϕ such that uA = ϕ ◦ uB . Moreover, ϕ is strictly
increasing because uA and uB are strictly increasing.
Consider any f = (E1 : x1, · · · , En : xn) ∈ F and z ∈ X.
z %B Π (f) ∀Π
⇒
uB (z) ≥ PB (E1)uB (x1)+PB (E2)uB (x2)+PB (E3)uB (x3)+ · · ·+PB (En)uB (xn)
and uB (z) ≥ PB (E1)uB (x2)+PB (E2)uB (x1)+PB (E3)uB (x3)+· · ·+PB (En)uB (xn)
...
and uB (z) ≥ PB (E1)uB (xn)+PB (E2)uB (xn−1)+PB (E3)uB (xn−2)+· · ·+PB (En)uB (x1)
In total there are n! inequalities, and each outcome has been assigned to each event
(n− 1)! times.
Summing up these n! inequalities and dividing by n!, we have:
uB (z) ≥ 1nuB (x1) + 1nuB (x2) + · · ·+ 1nuB (xn)
⇔ ϕ (uB (z)) ≥ 1nϕ (uB (x1))+ · · ·+ 1nϕ (uB (xn)) because ϕ is strictly increasing and
concave.
⇒ uA (z) ≥ 1nuA (x1) + · · ·+ 1nuA (xn).
This inequality implies not[z ≺A Π(g) ∀Π] for any g = (F1 : x1, · · · , Fn : xn) whose
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outcomes are the same as those of f because:
[z ≺A Π(g) ∀Π]
⇒
uA (z) < PA (F1)uA (x1) +PA (F2)uA (x2) +PA (F3)uA (x3) + · · ·+PA (Fn)uA (xn)
and uA (z) < PA (F1)uA (x2)+PA (F2)uA (x1)+PA (F3)uA (x3)+· · ·+PA (Fn)uA (xn)
...
and uA (z) < PA (F1)uA (xn)+PA (F2)uA (xn−1)+PA (F3)uA (xn−2)+· · ·+PA (Fn)uA (x1).
Summing these n! inequalities, and dividing them by n! implies
uA (z) <
1
nuA (x1) + · · ·+ 1nuA (xn).
(i)⇒ (ii)
Below we prove not (ii) ⇒ not (i) if there exist, for some integer n, two n-
fold partitions {Ei}n and {Fi}n of S such that PA(Fi) = PB(Ei) = 1n for all i ∈
{1, · · · , n}.
Proof. Remember that uA and uB are strictly increasing. We can therefore define ϕ
over the image of uB by ϕ = uA ◦ u−1B . Consequently, ϕ is also strictly increasing.
Not (ii)⇒ there exists u1, · · · , un belonging to the domain of uB such that
ϕ
(
1
n (u1 + · · ·+ un)
)
< 1nϕ (u1) + · · ·+ 1nϕ (un)
The outcomes x1, · · · , xn are uniquely defined by uB (x1) = u1, · · · , uB (xn) = un
and z is defined by uB (z) = 1n (u1 + · · ·+ un).
Consider a partition {Ei}n such that PB(Ei) = 1n for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n} (which
is assumed to exist), the act f assigning (x1, · · · , xn) to (E1, · · · , En) and all its
permutations Π(f). The equality uB (z) = 1nu1 + · · · + 1nun implies z ∼B Π(f) for
all Π.
Yet, uA (z) = ϕ (uB (z)) = ϕ
(
1
n (u1 + · · ·+ un)
)
< 1nϕ (u1) + · · ·+ 1nϕ ((un)) = 1nuA(x1) + · · ·+ 1nuA(xn).
Consider a partition {Fi}n such that PA(Fi) = 1n for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n} (which is
also assumed to exist), the act g assigning (x1, · · · , xn) to (F1, · · · , Fn) and all its
permutations Π(g).
The inequality uA (z) < 1nuA(x1) + · · · + 1nuA(xn) implies z ≺A Π(g) for all Π, and
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hence not (i).
9.4 Proof of Proposition 5
(ii)⇒ (i)
Proof. By the definition of "more concave", uA more concave than uB implies that
there exists a concave function ϕ such that uA = ϕ ◦ uB . Moreover, ϕ is strictly
increasing because uA and uB are strictly increasing.
Consider any f = (E1 : x1, · · · , En : xn) ∈ F and z ∈ X.
z %B pim (f) ∀m
⇒
uB (z) ≥ PB (E1)uB (x1)+PB (E2)uB (x2)+PB (E3)uB (x3)+ · · ·+PB (En)uB (xn)
and uB (z) ≥ PB (E1)uB (x2)+PB (E2)uB (x3)+PB (E3)uB (x4)+· · ·+PB (En)uB (x1)
...
and uB (z) ≥ PB (E1)uB (xn)+PB (E2)uB (x1)+PB (E3)uB (x2)+· · ·+PB (En)uB (xn−1)
In total there are n inequalities, and each outcome has been assigned to each event
1 single time.
Summing up these n inequalities and dividing by n, we have:
uB (z) ≥ 1nuB (x1) + 1nuB (x2) + · · ·+ 1nuB (xn)
⇔ ϕ (uB (z)) ≥ 1nϕ (uB (x1))+ · · ·+ 1nϕ (uB (xn)) because ϕ is strictly increasing and
concave.
⇒ uA (z) ≥ 1nuA (x1) + · · ·+ 1nuA (xn).
This inequality implies not[z ≺A pim (g) ∀m] for any g = (F1 : x1, · · · , Fn : xn)
whose outcomes are the same as those of f because:
[z ≺A pim (g) ∀m]
⇒
uA (z) < PA (F1)uA (x1) +PA (F2)uA (x2) +PA (F3)uA (x3) + · · ·+PA (Fn)uA (xn)
and uA (z) < PA (F1)uA (x2)+PA (F2)uA (x3)+PA (F3)uA (x4)+· · ·+PA (Fn)uA (x1)
...
and uA (z) < PA (F1)uA (xn)+PA (F2)uA (x1)+PA (F3)uA (x2)+· · ·+PA (Fn)uA (xn−1).
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Summing these n inequalities, and dividing them by n implies
uA (z) <
1
nuA (x1) + · · ·+ 1nuA (xn).
(i)⇒ (ii)
Below we prove not (ii) ⇒ not (i) if there exist, for some integer n, two n-
fold partitions {Ei}n and {Fi}n of S such that PA(Fi) = PB(Ei) = 1n for all i ∈
{1, · · · , n}.
Proof. Remember that uA and uB are strictly increasing. We can therefore define ϕ
over the image of uB by ϕ = uA ◦ u−1B . Consequently, ϕ is also strictly increasing.
Not (ii)⇒ there exists u1, · · · , un belonging to the domain of uB such that
ϕ
(
1
n (u1 + · · ·+ un)
)
< 1nϕ (u1) + · · ·+ 1nϕ (un)
The outcomes x1, · · · , xn are uniquely defined by uB (x1) = u1, · · · , uB (xn) = un
and z is defined by uB (z) = 1n (u1 + · · ·+ un).
Consider a partition {Ei}n such that PB(Ei) = 1n for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n} (which is
assumed to exist), and the act f assigning (x1, · · · , xn) to (E1, · · · , En). The equality
uB (z) =
1
nu1 + · · ·+ 1nun implies z ∼B pim(f) for all m.
Yet, uA (z) = ϕ (uB (z)) = ϕ
(
1
n (u1 + · · ·+ un)
)
< 1nϕ (u1) + · · ·+ 1nϕ ((un)) = 1nuA(x1) + · · ·+ 1nuA(xn).
Consider a partition {Fi}n such that PA(Fi) = 1n for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n} (which is
also assumed to exist) and the act g assigning (x1, · · · , xn) to (F1, · · · , Fn). The
inequality uA (z) < 1nuA(x1) + · · · + 1nuA(xn) implies z ≺A pim(g) for all m, and
hence not (i).
9.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. It is enough to notice that the proof of Proposition 2 does not use the fact
that E and F belongs to the same Σ.
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9.6 Proof of Proposition 7
According to Proposition 1.4.2 of Dupuis and Ellis (1997), for all countably
additive probability measures Q ∈ ∆(S) and for all Σ-measurable functions f ,
min
p∈∆(S)
∫
S
W (f(s))dp(s) + θiR(P ||Qi) = φ−1θi
(∫
S
φθi(W (f(s)))dQi(s)
)
with φθi(t) =
−e− 1θi t. Since φ−1θi is strictly increasing, minp∈∆(S)
∫
S
W (f(s))dp(s) + θiR(P ||Qi) is or-
dinally equivalent to
∫
S
φθi(W (f(s)))dQi(s). Noticing that the lower θi, the more
concave φθi , Proposition 7 follows from Proposition 2.
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Chapter 10
Appendix IV: Experimenter’s
protocol in Chapter 5
1. Is this number how much I want to pay for / sell for this lottery?
“This is a valuation task, and you are asked to fill in how much is this lottery
worth to you. Our payment procedure is designed to guarantee that it is for your best
interest to fill in the exact valuation in your mind, which dominates both overstating
and understating this value.” (Specifically avoid mentioning “buy” or “sell” in the
explanation.)
2. In case the subject gives a valuation lower than the lower outcome in the
lottery.
“Sorry to interrupt. You can surely put whatever amount you see proper as your
valuation. This is just a reminder, because here you put a valuation lower than
the lower possible outcome in the lottery, and I want to clarify the rules in case
there is any misunderstanding. Since we will only randomly draw a number from
the lower outcome and the higher outcome of a given lottery, in this case X and Y
(X<Y are the two outcomes of the lottery this subject is valuating), therefore giving
a valuation lower than the lower outcome of the lottery means that all the random
number we draw would be higher than your valuation and therefore you will be paid
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that amount. In the extreme case, if we draw X, your valuation indicates that you
prefer to be paid X, rather than receiving this lottery that gives you at least X. Is
this what you prefer?”
3. In case the subject gives a valuation higher than the higher outcome in the
lottery.
“Sorry to interrupt. You can surely put whatever amount you see proper as your
valuation. This is just a reminder, because here you put a valuation higher than
the higher possible outcome in the lottery, and I want to clarify the rules in case
there is any misunderstanding. Since we will only randomly draw a number from
the lower outcome and the higher outcome of a given lottery, in this case X and Y
(X<Y are the two outcomes of the lottery this subject is valuating), therefore giving
a valuation higher than the higher outcome of the lottery means that all the random
number we draw would be lower than your valuation and therefore you will receive
the lottery. In the extreme case, if we draw Y, your valuation indicates that rather
than receiving Y, you prefer to receive the lottery that gives you at most Y. Is this
what you prefer?”
4. In the cash treatment, make sure the subject put all the notes and coins for
valuation back to the box after finishing each valuation.
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Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift wordt getoond dat fouten in individueel keuzegedrag vaak
voortvloeien naar interpersoonlijke situaties. De verschillende hoofdstukken tonen
hoe de gedragsfouten worden verzwakt, versterkt of gerepliceerd door bepaalde in-
terpersoonlijke factoren in specifieke situaties.
Een van de meest natuurlijke interpersoonlijke situatie is groepskeuzegedrag.
De groepseffecten ten aanzien van keuzes bestaan uit aggregatie en communicatie,
en het ontvlechten van deze twee kan helpen bij het begrijpen en voorspellen van
groepskeuzes. Aangezien de twee maten van rationaliteit uit Hoofdstuk 2, stochastis-
che dominantie en verwacht nut maximalisatie (Expected Utility), dichotoom zijn
gebruiken we gesimuleerde keuzes van puur stemgedrag om communicatie-effecten
te isoleren. Het zou lastiger zijn om groepscommunicatie-effecten te identificeren
in taken met continue variabelen zoals loterijwaarderingen of kansequivalenten. De
uitdaging ligt in het vinden van een juist criterium dat rekening houdt met pure
aggregatie-effecten. Om de groepswaardering te simuleren op basis van puur stemge-
drag zou men aannames moeten maken omtrent de kans dat een persoon afhankelijk
van zijn prior stemt op een bepaald voorstel. Een alternatieve wijze waarop dergelijke
aannames niet gemaakt hoeven worden is een opzet waarbij groepsleden individuele
waarderingen noemen om tot de groepswaardering te komen.
De inhoud van de communicatie heeft mogelijk grote invloed. Hoofdstuk 3 beschri-
jft hoe simpele signalen aan individuen worden meegegeven met het doel hen te helpen
de kwaliteit van hun ontvangen interpersoonlijke communicatie in te schatten. De
verbetering van schattingen na interpersoonlijke uitwisseling van eerdere schattingen
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is afhankelijk van de mate waarin personen met nauwkeurigere schattingen dichter
bij hun originele schatting blijven dan personen met minder nauwkeurige schattin-
gen. Het uitwisselen van ondersteunend bewijs is een manier om individuen te helpen
met het inschatten van de relatieve nauwkeurigheid van hun schattingen t.o.v. de
ontvangen schattingen.
In Hoofstuk 4 wordt Yaari’s definitie van betrekkelijke risico-aversie uitgebreid
waardoor personen met verschillende kansinschattingen alsnog kunnen worden vergeleken.
De intuïtie achter het hoofdresultaat is simpel: om de afkeer tegen onzekerheid van
twee personen te vergelijken moet men niet slechts weddenschappen op aparte even-
ementen vergelijken, daarop hebben de eventueel verschillende kansinschattingen een
invloed, maar “weddenschapsparen” waarbij op het evenement en het complement
van het evenement wordt gewed. Het weddenschapspaar dient als maatstaf waarbij
voor eventueel verschillende kansinschattingen wordt gecorrigeerd.
Het laatste hoofdstuk lever bewijs voor het “cash-effect”: het louter tonen van
contant geld heeft een substantiële psychologische impact op de risico aversie van
mensen, doordat de waarschijnlijkheidsindifferentie in de kansweging wordt veran-
derd. Het feit dat het cash-effect lagere waarderingen tot stand brengt kan worden
verklaard door het “afding-instinct”: zodra men contant geld ziet is men geneigd een
lagere prijs te noemen. In later onderzoek kan de aanwezigheid en de totstandkoming
van dit instinct verder worden onderzocht.
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PROPOSITIONS 
 
1. Pure group communication effects cannot be properly observed 
without controlling for aggregation effects (Chapter 2). 
 
2. Group communication can more easily rectify errors in intellective 
tasks than biases in judgmental tasks (Chapter 2). 
 
3. Examples are by themselves weak in changing people’s estimations, 
but they can make a difference when combined with estimations 
(Chapter 3).  
 
4. Applying the right criteria, we can compare risk attitudes of people 
who hold different beliefs or face different sources of uncertainty 
(Chapter 4). 
 
5. Non-cash payment instruments not only change how we pay, but 
also how much we pay (Chapter 5). 
 
6. Decisions that are not made through reasoning are not likely to be 
improved by a bit more of that. 
 
7. There is a fine line between rectifying biases and introducing other 
biases with the opposite effects. 
 
8. The choice of control treatment in an experiment determines if the 
findings are inspiring, boring, or, in the worst case, misleading. 
 
9. Advances in technology have provided great opportunities to 
conduct experiments with people in the field and test the external 
validity of our knowledge in human behavior.   
 
10. The development of field experiment urges lab experimenters to 
create novel designs to test and develop economic theories. Using 
non-monetary outcomes is one of the promising directions for future 
lab experiments. 
 
11. No one should trust a proposition that does not rhyme. 
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